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1. Introduction 
The first chapter of this thesis sets out the guidelines and defines the limits for in which we have 
conducted our research. We start off by presenting the background to our choice of research, 
which is based on Alvesson and Kärreman’s (2007) idea of mystery creation. We then continue 
the chapter by problematizing the existing theories and by doing so also motivating our choice of 
theory. We finish off the chapter with concluding our purpose, research questions, and 
limitations.  
 
1.1. Theoretical Background 
Organizations are always in a state of change, but precisely what this entails is just a matter of 
choosing perspective: 
 
“From a distance (the macro level of analysis), when observers examine the flow of 
events that constitute organizing, they see what looks like repetitive action, routine, 
and inertia dotted with occasional episodes of revolutionary change. But a view from 
closer in (the micro level of analysis) suggests ongoing adaptation and adjustment.”  
Weick and Quinn, 1999:362 
 
Most change management literature make a distinction between ‘first-order’ (incremental) and 
‘second-order’ (discontinuous) change when defining a change process (Palmer et al., 2009). 
However, as pointed out in the quote from Weick and Quinn above, the very same change 
process could be viewed as stable or ongoing depending on the chosen perspective. The 
perspective of stability, often represented by Lewin’s (1951) three stages of change - unfreeze, 
change, refreeze - has been strongly questioned and problematized for its rationalistic and 
simplified view on organizations (Weick and Quinn, 1999). It has also been criticized for treating 
organizational change as a single and isolated event (Meyer and Stensaker, 2006). Organizational 
change is a much more complex area, which addresses different perspectives, contexts and people 
(Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). In order to obtain a more complete understanding of the 
micro level, the perspective of ongoing change is more preferable than the perspective of stability 
(Tsoukas and Chia, 2002).  
 
However, it is common that change management literature (see e.g. Heath and Heath, 2010; 
Kotter, 1996; Kotter, 2008; Patton and McCalman, 2010) automatically chooses a top 
management perspective, where focus is on how a change process could be implemented 
effectively (Johansson and Heide 2008b; Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). The last two decades’ 
explosion of management models, theories and concepts has often chosen the rationalistic view 
on organizations (Sveningsson and Sörgärde, 2007). The focus here is on how to implement an 
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organizational change effectively, rather than increasing the understanding of its complexity 
(Johansson and Heide, 2008b).  
The presumption that the models actually would work regardless of organization reveals not only 
a fairly simplified view on organizations (Sveningsson and Sörgärde, 2007), but it also sheds light 
on the top management’s insecurity regarding the pressures they face. We are often told that 
globalization, technological development and/or increasing competition force organizations to 
change (Sveningsson and Sörgärde, 2007). In this business climate, top management is faced with 
internal and external pressures to change (Palmer et al., 2009). However, the risks of changing 
must be compared to the risks of not changing. Beer and Nohria (2000) state that; “Most 
traditional organizations have accepted, in theory at least, that they must either change or die” 
(2000:133). The problem is that a majority of the change initiatives fail (Beer and Nohria, 2000; 
Palmer et al., 2009).  
 
1.2. Problematization  
The idea that top-down companywide change programs, quality circles or other training courses 
sponsored by corporate groups such as human resources, will transform organizations is incorrect 
according to Beer et al. (1990). So is the idea that new structural changes automatically will change 
the behavior of the organizational members. The authors state that organizational change is about 
learning, whereupon top-down change processes become “too risky as a deliberate strategy” 
(1990:159). In their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, Beer et al. 
(1990) concluded that senior managers often understand the necessity for change, but 
“misunderstand what it takes to bring it about” (1990:158). Furthermore, the authors state that 
bottom-up “grass-rooted change processes” are more successful in reaching the intended 
outcome, than top-down initiatives due to the organizational learning procedure. The most 
successful top managers in the study acknowledged their limited power and created a climate for 
change, rather than insisting on specific solutions or spreading lessons of success and failure. In 
conclusion, top managers are faced during organizational change processes with the paradox of  
“directing a ‘nondirective’ change process” (Beer et al., 1990:159) and a trade-off between 
allowing uncertainty and creating resistance, from the top management’s point of view.  
 
This situation naturally put pressure on top management since ‘doing nothing’ and ‘doing 
something’ are thus both seen as risky activities. In contrast, some top managers simply decide to 
change the organization for the sake of the change on a regular basis; “organizational change 
processes are often seen as ‘strengthening sauna baths’ – the more frequently recurring, the 
better” (Johansson and Heide, 2008a:289). Alvesson (2006) argues that changing for the sake of 
the change could be viewed as performing an illusion, where the image of performing something 
positive; being rational, politically correct, innovative etc., outweigh the change actions’ substantial 
value. Alvesson (2006) connect these pseudo actions to institutional theory, which states that many 
organizational change processes are more influenced by a concept’s popularity than its substantial 
value. Here, the mainstream trend reported in media or by change consultants has a large 
influence for top management in their choice of change initiatives. In addition to this, top 
managers tend to perceive and identify change initiatives in which they have been involved, as 
successful; “their self-serving bias may lead to ambiguous change efforts being not presented but 
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also understood in a positive way” (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008:149). In this sense, 
institutional theory does not only depict the insecurity among top managers but also reveal the 
often vague reasons behind change initiatives.  
 
In this thesis, we are looking at how insecurity and ambiguity within a top management group 
affect a top-down change process. We believe that the organizational members’ perceptions are 
crucial for the change process’ intended outcome. Therefore, we have examined how employees 
on different managerial levels perceive a change process characterized by ambiguity and insecurity 
among managers. We have analyzed how the organizational members’ sensemaking (micro-level 
dynamics) have affected their behavior and thus the outcome of the change process (macro-level 
impacts). In this sense, we acknowledge Ford and Ford’s (1995) view on organizational change, as 
being a phenomenon constructed by human social interactions, and thus a phenomenon that 
occurs within communication.  
 
Scholars’ interest of studying how organizational members make sense in complex organizational 
changes has increased during the last two decades, but various authors have stressed that there is 
still a need for more empirical studies within the field of sensemaking (Weick, et al., 2005, p.419; 
Balogun and Johnson, 2005, p.1597; Thurlow and Mills, 2009, p. 460). In addition to this, we 
have found undertheorized gaps in the existing sensemaking theory regarding the process of how 
cues and frames are connected and what the process of sensemaking looks like in detail. We 
would argue that the sensemaking theory will help us to increase the understanding of the 
empirical findings from our research. 
 
1.3. Study Object 
We have studied a currently undergoing organizational change process and how the 
organizational members make and give sense of the change process during the implementation of 
it. We conducted a qualitative single-case study at our case study company, Blutex (fictitious 
name). Blutex is carrying out a two-year top-down change program for their salesforce where the 
participants are asked to change their professional mindset, attitude, and behavior. The change 
program is a part of a larger fundamental strategic change process, in which Blutex aims to change 
its business model, organizational culture and identity. When conducting our research, we found 
elements that puzzled us. We saw how the top management’s ambiguous communication within 
the top-down change process resulted in a strong consensus regarding the change’s importance, 
purpose and intended outcome. Everyone was positive to the change process but there was a wide 
variety of interpretations among the organizational members and at the same time everyone was 
certain about their own interpretation being ‘correct’.  
 
We used this ‘mystery’ as a basis for this thesis along the concept of ‘mystery creation’ developed 
by Alvesson and Kärreman (2007) who emphasize the usage of empirical material as the base for 
developing theory by problematizing existing frameworks and focusing on what puzzles the 
researcher. This is meant to create research that is interesting rather than obvious or irrelevant, 
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and to open up alternative ways of framing empirical material. The authors also encourage 
induction in research, letting the empirical material determine the path of the study as well as the 
choice of theory, where focus is on exploring the mystery of the empirical material. We will 
explain our method further in chapter 2. 
 
1.4. Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of the thesis is to increase the understanding of an organization’s change process by 
interpreting organizational members’ lived experience during a change process. We aim to 
enhance the existing sensemaking theory by contributing with empirical research where 
sensemaking is used as the primary body of theory for analysis. As stated previously, we have 
during our research found the existing sensemaking theory to be undertheorized. Therefore, we 
have developed a framework in order for the reader of this thesis to understand our view on 
sensemaking and how cues and frames play part in the change process. 
 
In order to investigate this we have established the following research questions: 
1. What does the sensemaking process look like on an individual level from the 
perspective of cues and frames and how does it explain organizational members’ 
perceptions and behavior in a change process? 
2. How is it that organizational members can have diverse interpretations of a change 
process and at the same time (a) have consensus of the change as being something 
positive and (b) be sure that their individual interpretation of the change is ‘correct’? 
 
1.5. Limitations 
The change program at Blutex is carried out during two years (between Q3 2012 and Q3 2014) in 
five implementation phases throughout Blutex’s international salesforce. Since we are looking at 
the change process from a micro level we wished to exclude influential external factors by limiting 
our research to Blutex’s Swedish salesforce. This is to exclude possible cultural differences 
between countries. Our empirical material has been gathered in the period between the first and 
second implementation phase, during Q1 2013. This is interesting because it allows us to study 
the mystery of how people make sense of abstract phenomenon while they are still experiencing 
it. 
 
1.6. Disposition 
In the next chapter, we will present our research method in terms of our epistemological and 
ontological standpoints, and describe how we have conducted our research. Chapter 3 will consist 
of the theoretical framework which we have used in order to analyze the empirical material, where 
we have focused on Weick’s (1995) sensemaking theory. In chapter 4 and 5, we introduce our 
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empirical material and analysis. In chapter 4 we will present the context of our case study 
company and the top management’s problematization, followed by a description of the 
organizational members’ perceptions. In chapter 5 we will analyze the empirical material using 
our theoretical framework. However, we will also present more detailed empirical material in 
chapter 5 in order to substantiate our argumentation. Lastly in chapter 6, we will discuss the case 
study’s possible implications and make conclusions from our analysis. We then reflect upon our 
thesis in order to provide new reference points of the thesis’ conclusions. 
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2. Method 
In this chapter we will present our methodological, epistemological and ontological standpoints as 
well as describe the methods and strategies used for conducting our research and motivate why 
these are appropriate for our purpose. 
 
2.1 Research strategy 
Our research questions determine the course of action for the thesis. Since we focus on meanings 
and understandings rather than causal explanations, qualitative data is the most appropriate choice 
of research strategy. Qualitative research emphasizes words rather than quantification concerning 
the collection and analysis of data (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Normally this kind of research aims 
to generate theory and is therefore often inductive. This means that theory is the outcome of 
empirical research as opposed to having a predetermined theory that is to be tested through 
research, which is the case of the deductive approach. The two do however often entail a small 
portion of the other (Bryman and Bell, 2011) and this is true for our work as well. Our main 
approach have been inductive, though we made a brief theoretical overview before collecting data 
in order to increase our academic knowledge within the field of communication and 
organizational change. Choosing the qualitative research strategy demands certain epistemological 
and ontological standpoints, which are presented in the next two sections.  
 
2.1.1. Epistemology 
Qualitative research emphasizes the way individuals interpret their social world and is therefore 
closely related to the interpretivist doctrine (Bryman and Bell, 2011). This suits us as we will 
analyze the interpretations of employees at Blutex and interpret what they say in order to 
understand how they perceive their realities. We have further chosen to adapt the 
‘phenomenology’ philosophy since this regards the question of how individuals make sense of the 
world around them (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Sensemaking is what we study in this thesis whereby 
the ways individuals make sense of different phenomenon are of great importance to this thesis. 
 
2.1.2. Ontology 
The ontological point of view suited for qualitative research and for the epistemological 
viewpoints presented earlier is ‘constructionism’. This position treats everything as social 
constructions and implies that social phenomena and their meanings are being continually 
produced by social actors through interaction. Recently the term has also come to include the 
researcher’s own part in the constructed reality he/she studies. This means that every researcher 
presents a specific version of social reality rather than a definite one (Bryman and Bell, 2011). We 
are aware that the socially constructed realities we have depicted are not definitive and are not 
descriptions of a ‘true’ or ‘objective’ reality. We share Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2007) view on 
collected data as basis for interpretations rather than representation of reality; “there is no such 
thing as unmediated data or facts; there are always the results of interpretations” (2007:9).  
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2.2 Research design 
The research design is the framework for the collection and analysis for data (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Our research questions require us to analyze affective, cognitive, and behavioral aspects of 
individuals. Therefore, we have conducted in-depth research on a selection of employees in order 
to analyze their perceptions at a micro-level perspective.  
 
2.2.1. Single Case Study 
We have chosen to define our single case study according to Yin’s (2003) established definition; 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (2003:13). Furthermore Yin states that “the case study’s unique strength is its ability to 
deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations – beyond 
what might be available in a conventional history study” (2003:8). Usually the researcher of a case 
study is keen to shed light on the unique features of the case which is known as the idiographic 
approach (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Stake (1995) has established a set of case types; intrinsic and 
instrumental cases. The difference between the two is to what they aim to bring insight. The goal 
of intrinsic cases is to gain insight into the particularities of the situation, as opposed to the 
instrumental cases which are used as a mean of understanding a broader generic issue (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). Hence we argue that our single case study is idiographic and intrinsic as we are 
interested in finding unique opinions and thoughts among the employees in order to understand 
what is going on inside Blutex during the change process rather than to increase the understanding 
of change processes in general. 
 
According to Yin (2003) there are three ways to execute a case study; descriptively, explanatory 
and exploratory. We explore an undergoing change process, not with the purpose to explain or 
describe causalities, but to increase the understanding of the complex phenomenon - thus making 
our case study exploratory.  
 
2.2.2. Research Criteria  
Generally case studies with a qualitative orientation tend to play down the significance of research 
criteria as opposed to the quantitative studies which portray them as more important (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). This also varies between authors as some, for example Yin (2003), talks about ways to 
improve the ability to meet the criteria, whilst others, for example Stake (1995), barely mention 
them at all. Lincoln and Guba (1985) have established a framework for research criteria for 
qualitative research where the main focus is on the trustworthiness of the research and its 
transferability. However, we believe this view becomes irrelevant in relation to our interpretative 
and constructionist perspective and we have therefore decided to mention the criteria of this study 
in a way that we believe is more relevant. We have chosen to discuss the following criteria; 
validity, reliability, and generalizability.  
 
We prefer the definition of validity from quantitative studies even though this is a qualitative 
study. Validity in quantitative studies concerns the degree to which the researchers measure what 
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they aim to measure (Bryman and Bell, 2011). If we directly translate this to our case, we want to 
study (i.e. measure) the perceptions of the employees. However, the only way of finding out what 
people think is simply to talk to them. This means that we in fact cannot measure what we want to 
measure. Instead we ‘measure’ what people say, which in some way reflects their perceptions. 
However it is important to have in mind that what people say may differ from what people think 
or feel. Reliability is a similar concept but regards how consistent the technique for measurement 
is (Bryman and Bell, 2011). We therefore regard reliability as the degree of credibility in the 
admissions of the interviewees. How we have taken these research criteria into account is further 
discussed in section 2.3.1. 
 
Generalizability is the degree to which the case study’s findings can be transferred to other 
contexts beyond those of the research (Bryman and Bell, 2011). We argue however that this is 
irrelevant for explorative case studies as each case has unique environments and conditions. 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011) there are many researchers that make generalizations from 
their cases and strive to achieve a degree of theoretical generalizability. We do instead share Lee, 
Collier and Cullen’s (2007) suggestion, that particularization constitute the main strength of case 
studies rather than generalization. The goal should therefore be to concentrate on the uniqueness 
of the case and develop a deep understanding of its complexity (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
 
To sum up, as we conduct our research along Alvesson and Kärreman’s (2007) idea of mystery 
creation, we share their key assumptions that social science is all about interpretations and that it is 
counterproductive to try to minimize the influence of subjectivity. Hence, instead of focusing on 
research criteria in this chapter, we will reflect upon our research in chapter 6.  
 
2.3. Data Collection 
In our in-depth research, we have chosen semi-structured interviews as the primary source of data. 
Furthermore, as secondary data we have analyzed corporate documents and other official 
material, such as Blutex’s web page and PR-material. In addition to this, we have also made 
observations during our time spent at Blutex’s head office and in our role as observing 
participants in meetings and training sessions.  
 
2.3.1. Primary Data - Interviews 
Qualitative research is often conducted through interviews, a method which offers high flexibility 
for the researchers (Bryman and Bell, 2011). We conducted ten in-depth interviews, a common 
number of interviews for a thesis like this (Ahrne and Svensson, 2011). The shortest interview was 
60 minutes and the longest 100 minutes. In addition, we also conducted a 40 minutes long initial 
pilot interview with a top manager at Blutex as an introductive scope to our inductive research. To 
sum up; we interviewed 8 men and 3 women on three different hierarchical levels; top managers 
(3), middle managers (3) and salespeople (5). The interviewees had different working experiences 
and education and had been working at Blutex between 2 and 25 years. It has been important to 
interview people on different hierarchical levels since we are focusing on how people make and 
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give sense in an organizational change process. We conducted our interviews in neutral 
environments such as conference rooms on four different Blutex sites in Sweden, except for one 
middle manager who was interviewed at his/her office. Our last interview was unfortunately made 
over the telephone, due to the interviewee’s busy schedule and the geographical distance. In 
general, we have been keen on conducting the interviews face-to-face in order to make the 
interviewees feel comfortable and to increase the social interaction. Our choice of interview 
method is described in the next paragraph. We believe that our choice of interviewees has 
generated a fairly representative picture of the perceptions of Blutex’s change process.  
 
Interviews can be performed in a number of different ways which range from strict structured 
interviews to unstructured free interviews that are similar to normal conversations. In qualitative 
research there is a great interest in understanding the interviewee’s point of view and in order to 
collect this, the interviewee must be able to speak his/her mind, thus sharing his/her social reality. 
Alvesson (2011) states that ‘romanticism’ as an interview method, encourages the interviewee to 
speak freely and talk about what he/she see as important. It is believed that subjective authentic 
experiences will be shared during the interview through romanticism, not only in terms of 
emotions but also cognitive perceptions about ideas, values and understandings.  
 
We share this view and we have used romanticism to a great extent in our interviews. We have 
encouraged the interviewees to speak freely and to guide us through their perspective rather than 
to ask them pre-determined questions. The goal has been to make the interviewees share their 
social realities through open questions. The more critical questions from a holistic perspective, 
about contradictions or equivocalities, have seldom been asked directly to the interviewees. 
Instead, we have interpreted the answers to these questions by analyzing the transcriptions 
afterwards. To sum up, we gathered a rather fragmented material with lots of inputs, opinions, 
feelings, and understandings of the context, which we later categorized, structured, and interpreted 
by asking more straightforward questions to ourselves. How the material has been analyzed is 
described in further detail in chapter 2.4.  
 
After our pilot interview, we conducted an initial interview guide which we used mainly during our 
two first interviews, whereupon we learned not only how to conduct an interview but also which 
specific themes we were interested in. The interviews have often departed from our initial 
interview guide and have provided us with an empirical material different from what we first 
expected. We have according with Alvesson’s (2011) and Bryman and Bell’s (2011) 
recommendations, focused on asking good follow-up questions to expand the possible analysis in 
order to get rich, detailed answers.  
 
The interviews have been digitally recorded to the interviewees’ consent and then transcribed the 
same day to the extent this has been possible. This was to keep everything fresh in mind and to 
get it all on paper as soon as possible. At one point we performed three interviews on the same 
day which made us fall behind with the transcriptions and they were instead transcribed a few days 
later. When transcribing, we have tried not to leave out any words, hesitations or pauses to be able 
 
14 
 
to also analyze both what the interviewees say and how they say it. The transcriptions have then 
been sent to the interviewees with the invitation to respond if there were any factual errors. Except 
for two minor language corrections due to mishear from the recordings, all of the interviews were 
approved immediately. The selection of quotes has been made after our comprehensive analysis, 
whereupon the selected quotes have been translated from Swedish to English by us.  
 
We would also like to emphasize the weaknesses of collecting data through interviews. Even 
though we use an interpretative perspective and a romantic interview method, there are 
fundamental risks in terms of reliability. We have indirectly asked people to share their socially 
constructed reality - affectively, cognitively and behaviorally. However, to what extent the 
interviewees answer honestly is hard to tell. It has been one of our most debated issues in our 
work; how do we make people to speak freely and how do we know they are honest? The 
simplest and probably most accurate answer is of course that we cannot know. Our approach to 
this methodological dilemma is that we consider the primary data as descriptions of organizational 
members’ social realities rather than the actual social realities themselves. To further handle the 
inevitable weakness of interviews we have emphasized the anonymousness of the interviewees. 
 
At the time we conducted our interviews, the first out of five training sessions had been completed 
for the salespeople. The first training session took place in January 2013, six months after the 
change program had been introduced.  
 
2.3.2. Secondary Data - Corporate Documents and Official Material 
As secondary data, we have analyzed some of the printed and published material from Blutex. 
Some of the material has been internal; such as corporate documents, teaching material, and 
intranet information, whilst other has been external; website information, Powerpoint 
presentations and other official PR-material. We have used the secondary data as a comparable 
‘official story’ in our analysis. In other words, we compared the gathered material from our 
interviews where organizational members share their social realities, with the promoted material.  
 
2.3.3. Participant Observations 
In addition to the primary and secondary data, we have also made observations. Firstly, we have 
had our own office at Blutex’s head office between January and May where most of this thesis’ 
work has been conducted. During this time, we obviously have been able to make several 
observations by talking to other organizational members and walking around in the facilities. 
Secondly, one of us has participated as an observer in both preparatory interview sessions in the 
work of conducting the change program in August 2012, and during the change program’s first 
training session for the middle managers in December 2012. In addition, the same one has also 
been working part time at Blutex with other work tasks since June 2012. This circumstance is 
discussed and reflected upon in section 2.5. We have used these observations as a 
complementary source where we compare the lived experiences of the organizational members 
with our own lived experiences, i.e. our observations.  
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2.4 Analytical Framework 
Our empirical material is in the form of transcriptions which have been analyzed based on 
conversation analysis. Bryman and Bell (2011) defines conversation analysis as; “a fine-grained 
analysis of talk as it occurs in naturally occurring situations. The talk is usually recorded and 
transcribed so that the detailed analyses can be carried out” (2011:521). This goes hand-in-hand 
with Alvesson’s (2011) idea of romanticism, to engage interviews as conversations. What can be 
questioned however is whether the interview can be described as a “normally occurring situation”. 
We have had this in mind and tried to make the setting for the interview as informal and familiar 
as possible by conducting them in the home environments of the interviewees and keeping a 
relaxed mood during the interviews and trying to keep it similar to a normal conversation, which 
comes naturally with the open-ended questions. 
 
A dilemma of the conversation analysis is that using it interpretatively to understand social action 
or culture carries the risk of misinterpretation and misunderstanding. On the other hand 
prohibiting speculations of this kind in order to avoid misunderstandings is potentially restrictive 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). As stated in 2.2.3. we are aware that what we depict in this thesis is our 
interpretation of the interpretations of others, and the ‘reality’ we portray may be different from 
the reality of others. 
 
2.5. Insider-Outsider Reflection 
We have identified a few issues with our approaches which call for a reflection as to specify how 
these might affect our work. An important aspect is that one of the authors have been working at 
Blutex for almost a year and the idea of writing a thesis about the company was developed in 
unison with the top management of Blutex. Meanwhile, the other author had little knowledge 
about the company before the research project was initiated. Alvesson (2009) states that it is 
difficult to study something that one is heavily involved in, but that it may be a resource as much 
as a liability. He suggests that collaborating with an external co-author is an option to avoid one-
sidedness of research. Björkman and Huzzard (2005) say that having an insider-outsider approach 
gives two distinct perspectives, as well as access to rich data sources that would normally not be 
available to researchers from the outside.  
 
We have found that our insider-outsider approach first and foremost have given us a top priority 
within the company as well as high access to corporate documentation. It has for example been 
fairly easy to schedule interviews and getting in contact with interviewees. However, a weakness 
which we have reflected upon is that interviewees might be hesitant to answer the questions 
honestly, suspecting that answering critically or 'wrong' may have negative effects for them 
individually, since we co-operate with the top management. This may reduce the reliability of our 
case study but we have also felt that the insider has contributed to achieving a more casual setting 
for the interviews and as he has more knowledge about the internal context of the company, he 
has been able to ask more specific follow-up questions. 
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Furthermore when writing this thesis we have had a separate office at the Blutex headquarters 
which have been very beneficial since we have been able to work undisturbed, easily coming in 
contact with people inside the company and also being able to observe what actually is being 
discussed in the coffee room.  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter we will present the theoretical framework we have used in our analysis of the case 
study. The choice of theories is based on our inductive findings in the empirical material. We 
believe that the relationship between communication and change is undertheorized in 
organizational studies. Furthermore, we use the concept of sensemaking in order to increase the 
understanding of an organizational change from an interpretative perspective. 
 
3.1. Communication  
The importance of communication in change processes is often acknowledged within the 
academic literature, as an essential part of the change process (see e.g. Alvesson, 2002; Beer et al., 
1990; Ford and Ford, 1995; Heracleous, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Mumby, 1988). Also in the vast 
amount of practitioner literature, communication is regarded as an essential ingredient in the 
change process. Lewis et al. (2006) analyzed Amazon.com’s top 100 best-selling books on 
organizational change and concluded that; “Nearly all of these books (...) acknowledged the 
critical importance of communication in change” (2006:132). Unfortunately, the advice in the 
books; “often lacked detail and appropriate qualification” (2006:132). 
 
On the one hand, there is consensus in acknowledging the importance of communication within 
change processes, but on the other hand the different views, perspectives, and goals of the 
research generate a fragmented picture of the meanings and implications of communication. 
Johansson and Heide (2008a) analyzed approximately 100 articles on organizational change 
published between 1995 and 2007, and categorized them by determining the authors' view on 
communication. Despite the framework’s rather sophisticated categorization, we chose to see the 
framework as a description of the development within the research of communication and 
change. The traditional research uses a realist epistemology where communication is viewed as a 
“tool for transmission” (Johansson and Heide, 2008a:291) and sees organizations as rational and 
controllable systems. The purpose of using communication is to ensure that the members of the 
organization have understood the message of the change process, and thus establishing a ‘sense of 
urgency’ in terms of its vision, goals and reasons (Kotter, 1996; Kotter, 2008). According to 
Johansson and Heide (2008a) communication in this view becomes an important, but isolated 
phenomenon from the organization in this perspective. In contrast, an increasing number of 
scholars use a constructionist epistemology where communication is acknowledged as the very 
process in which change occur. Johansson and Heide (2008a) describe a trend where an 
increasing number of scholars are interested in understanding and explaining communication and 
change processes, rather than studying how leaders can make communication more effective in a 
rationalistic manner. However, this is not a new, nor a controversial view on change. As an 
illustration to this, we start the next section with a 25-year old quote which will represent this 
'trend'. 
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3.1.1. Communication is Change   
 
“In an organizational context, communication is the process through which meaning 
is created and, over time, sedimented. Communication - as an institutional form - 
articulates meaning formations which, when habitualized over time, provide the 
background of common experience that gives organization members a context for 
their organizing behavior. Communication is thus not simply the vehicle for 
information, but rather is the very process by which the notion of organizing comes 
to acquire consensual meaning. Organizing is therefore continuously created and 
recreated in the act of communication among organization members.”  
Mumby, 1988:14-15 
 
We believe that it is within communication that organizing and thus change occur. 
Communication is more than a tool for explaining change (Ford and Ford, 1995) or a ‘vehicle for 
information’ (Mumby, 1988). In this sense, communication and organizing become the same 
phenomenon, where meaning and understanding is created within the communication (Alvesson, 
2002). Ford and Ford (1995) state that change is a socially constructed process where the 
communication process create, modify and sustain new realities; “Producing intentional change 
(...) is a matter of deliberately bringing into existence, through communication, a new reality or set 
of social structures” (1995:542).  
 
According to Beech and Johnson (2005), there is a high chance that the communicated 
information will be interpreted differently within a messy, socially constructed change process. 
The authors view the communication actions as micro-level dynamics with macro-level impacts; 
“If the impacts of the [micro-level dynamics] are dismissed as ‘resistance to change’ or the 
emotional reactions of individuals, then they are unlikely to be properly addressed” (Beech and 
Johnson, 2005:45).  
 
In the next section, we will present and explain the theory of organizational sensemaking in order 
to address and analyze these micro-level dynamics. In other words, to explain and analyze how 
communication creates new social realities on an individual level.  
 
3.2. Organizational Sensemaking  
The organizational sensemaking concept was developed by Weick from his initial criticism of 
traditional approaches to organizational analysis (Helms Mills, 2003). It is closely related to 
psychology and the way people understand what they experience by categorizing and labeling. 
When we as human beings experience events, we immediately begin the work of organizing by 
labeling and categorizing to find a common ground to what is happening (Weick et al., 2005). 
George Lakoff (1987) explains the concept of categorization as the most basic principle for our 
thought, perception, action and speech. Several similarities to sensemaking can be distinguished. 
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For instance, Lakoff explains how categorization is automatic and unconscious and that it is 
central to how we think and understand the world. We will come back to categorization later in 
section 3.2.9. 
 
Weick (1995) clarifies from the start that sensemaking is not as much a body of knowledge as a 
“developing set of ideas with explanatory possibilities” (1995:3) but his notion of sensemaking has 
become more refined over the last decades (Helms Mills, 2003). According to Helms Mills et al. 
(2010) sensemaking is not yet widely recognized as a method of analysis, but there have been 
several studies that use sensemaking as a heuristic for understanding the processes that leads to 
various outcomes. The authors conclude that sensemaking has explanatory power and can for 
instance be used to understand organizational disasters, decision-making, and resistance. They 
also point out that there is “a lack of empirical studies that draws specifically upon Weick’s 
framework as a method of analysis” (Helms Mills et al., 2010:192). 
 
3.2.1. What is Sensemaking?  
As the name implies, sensemaking is literally about the making of sense (Weick, 1995). Weick 
(1995) cites Sackmann’s (1991) established definition that views sensemaking as; “Mechanisms 
that include the standards and rules for perceiving, interpreting, believing, and acting that are 
typically used in a given cultural setting”. What this means is that sensemaking is the cognitive 
maps (standards and rules) for how we perceive, interpret and act in a special context (cultural 
setting) for example in an organization. This further implies that organizational sensemaking as we 
are discussing here should be separated from everyday sensemaking, which is not in “a given 
cultural setting”. This definition is also approved by Helms Mills (2003), hence this is the 
definition we have chosen to adopt. To simplify, one can say that sensemaking is a concept for 
understanding how different meanings are assigned to the same event in organizations. 
 
Weick (1995) points out the difference between interpretation and sensemaking and that the two 
should not be confused with one another. Interpretation is only a part of sensemaking and the 
importance of sensemaking lies in the steps that precede interpretation; “Sensemaking is about 
the ways people generate what they interpret” (Weick, 1995:13). 
 
Weick (1995) lists seven properties of sensemaking: 
1) Grounded in identity construction 
2) Retrospective 
3) Enactive of sensible environments 
4) Social 
5) Ongoing 
6) Focused on and by extracted cues 
7) Driven by plausibility 
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We will summarize these briefly as they were explained in Weick (1995:17-62). (1) Sensemaking 
is grounded in identity construction since the way people make sense depends on that person’s 
identity and identity needs. The individual sensemaker/sensegiver affects the sensemaking process 
to the highest degree. (2) Sensemaking is retrospective because we draw on past experiences and 
compare them to present ones in order to make sense of them. (3) Enactment regards the fact 
that people often produce a part of the environment they face, i.e. people affect the very 
environment that they are affected by when making sense. (4) Sensemaking is social. It is based on 
social interaction, communication, understanding, and discourse. (5) Sensemaking is an ongoing 
process that cannot be deliberately controlled. It happens continually over time driven by 
continuous flows of impressions. (6) Extracting cues is a central part of sensemaking as these are 
what people use to make sense; “cues are small familiar structures that are seeds from which 
people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring” (Weick, 1995:50). The importance of 
cues will be further discussed in section 3.2.8. (7) Accuracy in sensemaking is not necessary, 
instead plausibility is of greater importance. People use plausible reasoning in order to make 
sense. It is often based on incomplete information but as long as the understandings provide 
enough certainty and fits the facts then that is how that person makes sense, even though the 
reasoning may not be correct or accurate (Isenberg, 1986).  Or as Alvesson et al. (2008) put it; “a 
map does not need to be accurate to be useful: the accuracy of a map may be less important than 
whether and how it is consumed” (2008:496). Since our research is based on the perceptions and 
behavior of the organizational members, their opinions and views are of great importance no 
matter how ‘inaccurate’ they might be. Hence the sensemaking theory fits well with our 
interpretivist epistemology. 
 
3.2.2. The Role of Expectations 
Weick (1995) also refers to Louis (1980) who views sensemaking as a recurring cycle of events 
that begin with people forming conscious and unconscious expectations and predictions about the 
future. When future events are discrepant from these predictions, it triggers the need for 
explanation, i.e. people start to act in a more conscious sensemaking mode (Weick, 1995) in 
order to develop meaning and interpret these discrepancies. Predictions and expectations are 
central in sensemaking as they guide people’s interpretations and serve as strong filters of inputs 
(Weick, 1995). So when interruptions occur; asking “what did I do?” might be less appropriate 
than “what did I expect?” (Berscheid and Ammazzalorso, 2003:318 cited in Weick et al., 2005). 
Törestad and Nystedt (1994), scholars within psychology, reinforce this idea by saying; 
“individuals do not only interpret situations from what has happened but also from what they 
hope will happen” (1994:156, translated by Malmberg). 
 
3.2.3. Emotion  
When interruptions to expectations occur they do not only trigger the sensemaking process but 
also an “emotional response, which then paves the way for emotion to influence sensemaking” 
(Weick, 1995:45). Emotion is preceded by ‘arousal’, a neurological phenomenon, which trigger 
‘fight-or-flight’ reactions (Berscheid, 1983; Mandler, 1984 mentioned in Weick, 1995). 
Sensemaking then works less effectively because arousal uses up attention and consumes 
information-processing capacity. The emotion does not necessarily have to be negative. If the 
unexpected event would accelerate the completion of a project, the emotion will be positive 
(Weick, 1995). It is however more likely that sudden interruptions summon negative emotions 
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which are likely to occur when the interruption is interpreted as harmful or detrimental. If there 
are no means to remove or circumvent the interruption, the negative emotion becomes more 
intense the longer the interruption lasts and the person starts to focus more on his/her agitated 
state than the task at hand (Weick, 1995). Thus it is in the interest of the individual to make sense 
of the interruption in order to find a solution to the problem. 
 
3.2.4. Sensegiving 
Weick (1995) uses a quote from Wallas (1926) that illustrates an important aspect of 
sensemaking. “The little girl had the making of a poet in her who, being told to be sure of her 
meaning before she spoke said; ‘How can I know what I think till I see what I say?’”. This quote 
serves as an illustration to the finding of Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) that sensemaking is 
incomplete without sensegiving. Sensegiving may take any form as long as it forces the person to 
formulate his/her thoughts into action. It does not have to be communicated orally; it might as 
well be written or enacted. It does not even have to reach out to any other person because the 
sensegiving affects the sensegiver as much as any other target. When you hear yourself talk, you 
see more clearly what matters and what you hoped to say (Weick et al. 2005). 
 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) describe the sensemaking process in four steps: 
1) A sensemaking effort is made by someone in order to understand a situation. 
2) A sensegiving effort is made by the same person in an attempt to communicate his/her 
vision to another person. 
3) A sensemaking effort is made by the other person trying to figure out the meaning of what 
was communicated to him/her. 
4) A sensegiving effort is made by the other person where he/she responds to the proposed 
vision. In turn affecting the first person in some way. 
 
They refer to it as a feedback loop or as “cycles of cognition and action by the involved parties” 
(1991:443). Our view on the sensemaking process is slightly different from Gioia and 
Chittipeddi’s rather general and straightforward model. We have however embraced their idea of 
sensegiving as the key that completes the process of sensemaking, as this notion has been 
acknowledged by Weick et al. (2005). 
 
3.2.5. The Role of Identity Construction  
Another distinction that is necessary to bear in mind is the difference between ‘everyday 
sensemaking’ and ‘organizational sensemaking’. Helms Mills (2003) state that sensemaking at the 
organizational level can offer an explanation for understanding management of change, whereas at 
the individual level it offers an explanation for understanding the management of meaning. What 
further differentiates the two are that organizations have means of control such as incentives and 
measures (Weick, 1995) as well as rules, routines, symbols and language that will have an impact 
on individuals’ sensemaking (Helms Mills et al., 2010). When routines and scripts are unavailable 
in organizations however, “the individual is left to fall back on his or her own ways of making 
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sense” (Helms Mills et al., 2010:185). This is why identity construction is central in sensemaking. 
Coopey et al. (1997) acknowledge this by stating; “[when] faced with events that disrupt normal 
expectations and, hence, the efficacy of established patterns of meaning and associated behavior, 
individuals attempt to make sense of ambiguous stimuli in ways that respond to their own identity 
needs” (1997:312). Weick (1995) draws upon Erez and Earley’s (1993) work where they 
distinguish “three self-derived needs that affect a person’s process to develop and maintain its 
changing sense of self; (1) The need for self-enhancement, as reflected in seeking and maintaining 
a positive cognitive and affective state about the self; (2) the self-efficacy motive, which is the desire 
to perceive oneself as competent and efficacious; and (3) the need for self-consistency, which is 
the desire to sense and experience coherence and continuity” (1993:28). In simple terms; “People 
see what they want to see” (Helms Mills, 2003:126) in order for it to fit into their lives and to 
enhance their living. The authors state that this insight provides an important clue to 
understanding organizational conflict and resistance to change. 
 
When people start making sense based on their individual cognitive maps, the organizational 
members start to make different interpretations of common events, whereupon the common 
frame of reference is lost. If coordinated activity is to occur, some level of shared understanding 
must exist (Barr and Huff, 1997) which raises the question whether sensemaking can be managed 
or not. 
 
3.2.6. Can Sensemaking Be Managed? 
According to Weick’s fifth property, sensemaking is an ongoing process which cannot be 
deliberately controlled. This is true in terms of how the individual sensemaker respond to the 
information cognitively and affectively, something which is impossible to control. However, there 
are ways for top managers to decrease what they perceive as ‘risks for misinterpretations’ within 
communication. According to Heide and Johansson (2008b) researchers in the management area 
see the task of creating collective frames and achieving common understanding in organizations, 
as being of great importance for modern leaders. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) conclude that the 
acts of making and giving sense about the interpretation of a new vision or change initiative in an 
organization, constitute key processes in managing change. Johansson (2003) conducted a survey 
on British companies that recently had implemented reorganizations to study the perceptions of 
the employees. What Johansson found was that there were immense gaps between how 
employees on different hierarchical levels perceived the change. Top managers saw great benefits 
with the reorganization whereas the employees saw big drawbacks. Other research confirms that 
managers on different hierarchical levels live in different realities and have separate perceptions 
on the operations of the organization (Johansson and Heide, 2008b). Johansson and Heide 
(2008b) conducted another survey on the employees of large Swedish corporations. The authors 
tried to measure the level of communication by looking at how well the employees could describe 
the goal of the change. A majority of the employees thought they could describe the goal well but 
their descriptions varied considerably from those of the management. The authors’ conclusion 
was that even though employees feel they know the goal of the change they might have made 
sense of it differently than the management meant for it to be interpreted.  
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Balogun and Johnson (2005:1596) suggest that “’managing’ change may be more to do with senior 
management striving to deliver clarity of purpose, expected outcomes and boundary conditions, 
and a shared understanding of these rather than trying to manage the detail”. Managers need to 
acknowledge that the employees interpret change differently and reconstruct the original message 
from the top management and its meaning (Jian, 2007). As a response to this Balogun and 
Johnson (2005) suggest that managers should start to encourage employees to engage in 
interaction (i.e. sensegiving and sensemaking) with people on the same hierarchical level, in their 
presence. This in order to exercise more control over the contexts of sensemaking rather than 
trying to control the sensemaking process itself. On the other hand the authors question to what 
extent managers can intervene in sensemaking processes. 
 
3.2.7. The Role of Middle Managers 
Another important aspect in organizational change processes is the role of the middle managers. 
Middle managers are key in top-down change initiatives as they are both recipients and deployers 
of the plans designed by senior management (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997). Balogun and 
Johnson (2005) recognize this as an area for future research as “we need to understand more 
about how middle managers, given their central role in change, and recipients, in general make 
sense of and therefore contribute to change outcomes in different contexts” (2005:1597). Middle 
managers are sometimes criticized for being opponents to change, but their role as intermediaries 
of change initiatives from top management is exposed and complex (Balogun et al., 2003). The 
interpretations they make about the change, affects (a) how they mediate it, (b) how they try to 
change personally, (c) how they help their co-workers, (d) how they keep the business running 
during the change process, and (e) what changes they actually implement in their departments. 
The informal communication often creates clearer frames of reference than planned 
communication does, which is why it is so important that middle managers are able to act as 
interpreters rather than informants (von Platen, 2006). Information is necessary for sensemaking 
but it is not enough on its own (Johansson and Heide, 2008b).  Middle managers further need to 
support the change by being properly informed and involved in the change process as well as 
feeling loyalty toward top management and subordinates. Balogun and Johnson (2005:1595) 
conclude that the greatest amount of middle manager sensemaking activity occur through the 
informal interactions in the absence of senior managers, making it difficult to control for top 
managers. 
 
3.2.8. Cues and Frames 
We find that in order to increase the understanding of the sensemaking process, one needs to 
look at what we believe are the two main elements in sensemaking and the mutual relationship 
between the two; cues and frames. Sensemaking is according to Weick (1995:133); “about 
enlargement of small cues. It is a search for contexts within which small details fit together and 
make sense”. Another way to describe it is as Weick et al. (2005) put it; “to make sense is to 
connect the abstract with the concrete” (2005:412), i.e., making connections between abstract cues 
and concrete cognitive frames. Helms Mills (2003) clarifies Weick’s view on cues and frames; 
“frames are derived from past moments of socialization, and cues are the result of present 
moments of experience” (2003:48). However it is not the cue or the frame that make sense, it is 
the connection between them; “A cue in a frame is what makes sense, not the cue alone or the 
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frame alone. Said differently, the substance of sensemaking starts with three elements; a frame, a 
cue, and a connection” (Weick, 1995:110). 
 
The idea of cues and frames are not specific for the sensemaking concept. One can connect cues 
and frames without having to make sense. It is when cues are perceived as abstract that 
sensemaking is triggered which is why cues and frames are a very important part of the 
sensemaking process. For instance, if a salesperson is told to participate in a sales education, an 
obvious connection between an ‘education-cue’ and an ‘education-frame’ is made.  
 
However if the cues are perceived as ambiguous, an obvious connection cannot be made. 
Ambiguity can take the form of either equivocality or vagueness. Weick (1995) defines 
equivocality as when several meanings can be assigned to the very same cue, as for example 
contradictory information. Ambiguity can in addition also be perceived as vague, for example lack 
of clarity. Equivocality and vagueness are subjective terms, as they depend on the person who is 
given the cue. A vague cue for example can make sense to someone if that person already has a 
solid frame for it, and an equivocal cue is equivocal first if the person already has a cue that is 
contradicting or inconsistent with the new cue.  
 
When a person is given ambiguous cues and no obvious connections can be made, the 
sensemaking process is triggered. A detailed description of the process itself is however only 
provided by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), though their model does still not describe the process 
in the terms of cues and frames. There seems to be a lack of research on the role of cues and 
frames in the sensemaking process as well as descriptions of what the process actually looks like. 
 
We felt that having a more detailed idea of how cues, frames and connections fit into the 
sensemaking process was necessary in order to analyze our case. Thus we have developed a 
framework to visualize the sensemaking process as we see it (Image 1). We have constructed it by 
gathering the existing descriptions of cues and frames, and discussing how they are related. Then 
we decided on how we view the process in order for it to fit with the descriptions in the literature 
(and so that it made sense to us). 
 
3.2.9. The Sensemaking Process in Detail 
From everything a person experiences, sees, hears, and so on – cues can be extracted. When a 
person is faced with a cue, that person wants to categorize it by connecting it to a frame. Frames 
are cognitive structures that are built up by previous cues (i.e. experiences). As long as there is an 
obvious frame to connect the new cue to, the person thinks he/she understands what the cue is 
and thus makes the connection. When the connection is made, the person is able to interpret that 
from which the cue originated. This is however not sensemaking since the cue immediately was 
placed into a frame. The sensemaking process is not triggered until the cue is abstract; meaning 
that it either fits into several frames or does not fit into any frame at all. When there is no obvious 
frame for a cue the sensemaking process starts with (1) an emotional reaction which influences the 
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rest of the process. After the emotion the person tries to (2) categorize the cue cognitively; i.e. to 
make sense of the cue by comparing it with existing frames and previous cues and by looking for 
more cues to aid in understanding the abstract cue. Facing a cue and not being able to connect it 
to a frame is to lose sense of something which is deeply troubling for an individual (Weick, 1995). 
Hence, people want to connect the cue to a frame as fast as possible. If no new cues are found fast 
enough to aid the categorization phase, the person might settle for the frame that fits best – even 
though he/she is not sure that it is the correct frame. The frame that a person deems as ‘best’ 
cognitively is affected by (a) the person’s identity, (b) his/her emotional reaction, and (c) external 
factors such as political interests, power, consequences, or persuasion (Mailloux, 1990). This is 
what Weick (1995) refer to as plausibility. In section 3.2.1. we mention the importance of 
plausibility; as long as the connection seems plausible a person can make sense. The objective 
‘truth’ does not matter as there is no wrong or right, just a number of interpretations, and they are 
all ‘true’ to the person who made the interpretation. This is where a lot of the sensemaking theory 
has been focused - on what affects the sensemaking process. Helms Mills (2003) has for example 
contributed to the area by introducing ‘critical sensemaking’ which emphasizes the importance of 
context and power for sensemaking. These aspects are of course interesting, but we feel that it is 
necessary to first understand how the sensemaking process works in order to see how things as 
context and power come into that process. 
 
 
Image 1) A vizualization of the sensemaking process 
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To continue, when a connection between a cue and a frame has been deemed plausible, the 
person needs to (3) give sense about the cue and frame through action, in order to make the 
connection. As stated in section 3.2.4. this action can take many forms; written text, speech, or just 
by acting in a way that enforces the connection. The sensegiving activity generates new cues for 
people to make sense of, including the sensegiver him-/herself. But as the person formulates 
his/her thoughts into words the connection is confirmed and the person (4) makes the connection 
between the cue and the frame. Once this is done, the person is able to put the origin of the cue 
in a context and is thereby able to relate to it. He/she can then finally (5) make an interpretation 
of the origin and thus make sense of it. 
 
However we want to bring to attention that the cues generated from the sensegiving may affect the 
sensegiver in a way so that he/she realizes that what he/she just said does not really fit into the 
person’s reality, it simply does not make sense. They do not notice this however, until they 
actually hear themselves saying it; getting their self-created cue and trying to fit it into their frame. 
Then realizing it does not fit, and having to look for new frames to connect it to in order to get a 
bigger picture of the origin of the cue. 
 
3.3. Summary 
We have in this chapter presented the theoretical framework on which we will base our analysis in 
chapter 5. Our main body of theory is Weick’s (1995) framework of sensemaking which we have 
extended by developing a model for how we view the individual’s sensemaking process. We do 
however not see our theoretical framework as a general tool for analyzing change processes. 
Instead we will use it in order to create a common contextual understanding for our 
interpretations of the empirical material. In the next two chapters we will present our empirical 
material and analyze it by drawing upon our theoretical framework. 
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4. Empirical Material 
In this chapter, Blutex and its organizational members are presented in terms of Blutex’s context 
and the top management’s problematization of the change process, and thereafter present the 
members’ perceptions and behavior. The empirical material mainly originates from our interviews 
with members of the Blutex organization. Corporate documents and observations are presented 
as complementary sources in the empirical material. Ten in-depth interviews have been 
conducted with employees from Blutex on three different managerial levels; top management, 
middle managers and salespeople.  
 
4.1. Blutex 
Blutex is a Swedish business-to-business (B2B) company with a dominant position in Scandinavia 
and Northern Europe. The company was founded in the early 20th century and has traditionally 
been in the graphical production industry. Blutex and its organizational members are often 
described as reliable in terms of ‘walking the extra mile’ in order to deliver promised results, 
which our observations, interviews and analysis confirms. Within traditional production at Blutex, 
most procedures are highly standardized but within the salesforce it is different. Sales managers 
(referred to as middle managers) and salespeople are more autonomous than their colleagues 
within production. However, we have observed a similar strong organizational identity among our 
interviewees and they claim to be proud of working at Blutex. 
 
The market in which Blutex operates has changed substantially due to the digital evolution 
according to the organizational members. Blutex has been successful in the past in adapting its 
product portfolio, but lately more and more output communication channels have become digital 
rather than physical. This has according to the top management at Blutex created new types of 
structural and cultural challenges for the company in general and for the salesforce in particular. 
As a response to this, the top management has decided to (a) make changes in the organizational 
structure, (b) make cultural changes by introducing a more proactive and business orientated 
mindset, and (c) educate the salesforce through a two-year change program referred to as 
‘Solution Selling’. Our focus will be on how the salesforce’s perceptions of the change program 
affect their actions and behavior.  
 
4.1.1. ‘Vision 2020’ and ‘Solution Selling’ 
The biggest challenge for Blutex according to the top management is to change its identity from 
being a graphical and production based company to becoming a solution based communication 
company. A crucial part of this change is seen by the top management as starting to package and 
sell value-creating unique solutions rather than standardized products. Top managers believe that 
this requires new and different working methods for the salesforce as well as new attitudes and 
mindsets, something which is described by the top management as a rather revolutionary change 
for most people working at Blutex: 
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“To stop talking about ‘costs’ and ‘price index’ and to start talking about how Blutex 
can add value is a big change in mindsets for us” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
This strategic change process has been formulated into a vision referred to as ‘Vision 2020’; to 
become the number one provider of communication solutions for existing and potential 
customers, fulfilling their need for communicating, regardless of the distribution channel, format 
or method (Teaching material 2013, Blutex). The goal is to reinforce Blutex’s position as a 
successful and dominant company by becoming a more professional communication supplier 
who increases revenues for its customers rather than cutting costs. The process of formulating 
‘Vision 2020’ is described by Blutex’s CEO: 
 
“I believe that we, during 2,3,4 years’ time, in different constellations and meetings, 
discussed the company’s future direction, but it basically ended up with me going 
into ‘the igloo’ together with a consultant. Then I formulated, based on everything I 
had heard - and I’ve been here for several years - that; ‘this is where we’re going - 
bam! Now it will be as follows; I will not have any further discussion about where we 
are going - however, I want every idea on how to get there’. (...) This is not a 
democracy, but it is my work to make sure that the decision is sufficiently grounded, 
by listening to everything - the market, the customer, the business environment or 
whatever it may be. At some point you need to decide where we’re going, because 
everyone keeps asking where we’re going and we can’t have a vote every time 
someone has an opinion” 
CEO, Blutex 
 
A first organized step in order to reach ‘Vision 2020’ was to implement a change program 
referred to as ‘Solution Selling’. It is believed that 'Solution Selling' as a change program will 
change the mindset (i.e. the perceptions) and behavior of the salesforce. In order to remain 
profitable and competitive, and to reach the intended outcome of the change process, top 
management states that Blutex’s salesforce must become more proactive: 
 
“It’s proactivity that guarantees that we’re one step ahead of our customers and 
continues to keep our competitors behind our back. And it’s also proactivity that 
identifies the opportunities leading to new projects and customers.” 
Teaching material 2013, Blutex 
 
This is where ‘Solution Selling’ comes in to the picture. In order to become more proactive, it is 
believed that the salesforce first needs to change the fairly traditional mindset and thereafter the 
way of selling Blutex’s products and services. ‘Solution Selling’ is believed to be the program that 
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will change the mindset culturally and the manner in which people do their daily work. It is the 
biggest educative program ever initiated within Blutex and is described by the top management as 
a highly prioritized program. The intended outcome is even promoted as being critical for 
Blutex’s survival. In conclusion, the company has invested a lot of resources, prestige and hope in 
‘Vision 2020’ and ‘Solution Selling’. Blutex defines the concept of ‘Solution Selling’ as follows: 
 
“‘Solution Selling’ - combine products and services into communication solutions 
that adds value to our customer’s needs”  
Teaching material 2013, Blutex 
 
‘Solution Selling’ as a program is planned to be implemented over a two-year period and was 
officially introduced in September 2012, during a big sales conference. Prior to this, the 
salespeople had been informed more or less unofficially that a new sales program was to be 
launched during the autumn of 2012. During the conference the top management presented the 
purpose, motives and objectives of ‘Solution Selling’ to the audience. The introduction itself was 
described by the organizational members as grandiose and inspiring. Just as ‘Vision 2020’, 
‘Solution Selling’ was also implemented top-down where the change initiative came from the top 
management.  
 
The traditional graphical production which has been the main part of Blutex’s business, is 
decreasingly demanded which is described as the biggest reason for changing the business focus 
by a majority of the organizational members. This view is shared by the top management, but they 
also state that organizations in general need to change on a regular basis. Changing for the sake of 
the change is therefore viewed as an additional reason for Blutex’s change. The organizational 
change process is in this sense viewed as a possibility to educate people and to balance different 
organizational pressures and trends. A third reason why Blutex is implementing ‘Solution Selling’ 
is described as a response to the trend of promoting solutions and value creation, rather than 
products. Selling solutions is according to the top management regarded as something modern 
and a bit more business orientated than selling products from a price-index. This reason is at the 
same time aligned with the strategic goal of increasing revenues for the customers rather than 
cutting their costs. To sum up, ‘Solution Selling’ is viewed as a substantial strategic step in the 
progress of stimulating Blutex into changing their organizational culture and working method 
towards ‘Vision 2020’. 
 
Before presenting the top management’s problematization, we would like to present the context 
of Blutex in terms of its organizational culture. This is in order to gain a deeper understanding of 
the context and thus the challenges which are faced in this case. In the next section, we will 
therefore describe Blutex’s organizational culture, communication climate and thereafter describe 
the salespeople’s and middle managers’ perceptions about ‘Vision 2020’ and ‘Solution Selling’. 
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4.1.2. Organizational Culture 
The organizational culture at Blutex is both promoted officially, and described by organizational 
members as warm, loyal and caring where people look after each other and work in teams to help 
each other achieve goals. According to organizational members on all hierarchical levels, the 
culture is very much colored by the production orientated tradition and by a strong loyalty within 
the workforce, as well as a passion for stretching the performance and fulfilling the targets in an 
efficient way. One middle manager stated that: 
 
“When [the direction/decisions] come, you try to inform but it’s not like you can 
influence them. But we try to explain and there... they are very loyal - the staff is 
unbelievably loyal at Blutex. So they comply with the decisions which are taken.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
The quote above does not only depict the strong loyalty but also the top-down management style. 
The top-down aspect of the culture is described as one of the most characterizing features of the 
organizational culture. 
 
“It is a very top-down organization with quite authoritarian leadership” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
“The culture is top-down I must say. The tradition is top-down (...) back in the days, 
you called the top manager and asked; ‘Can we buy this machine, yes or no?’ and 
then you had a decision and took it from there.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
In some cases, the top-down management style results in a fairly uncritical compliance towards 
both the decision itself and the manner in which it is implemented.  
 
Q: What do you think about the way the change process is implemented - that it is 
rolled out top-down? 
“*silence* Well, yeah... But the question is if there is any other way to implement it. 
I mean, the top management has told us that this is the change program we shall 
attend, and of course we have to accept that.  
Middle manager, Blutex 
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This is an essential aspect of Blutex’s organizational culture and an aspect which is relevant for 
our thesis due to its connection to the internal communication at Blutex. The top-down 
management style is deeply rooted in the culture and the perceived lack of influence has resulted 
in an organizational insecurity when it comes to employee participation in decision-making.  
 
“I have tried to get people to participate in bottom-up initiatives but that leads to 
insecurity in the organization, when I for example share a thought and expect a 
dialogue. Then they think; ‘that’s unclear, I didn’t understand what he meant’ (...) 
People have become very insecure when I have tried to get participation in an idea.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
Top managers experience this insecurity through, what they refer to as “upwards delegation”, 
meaning that organizational members are afraid to make decisions without getting permission 
from a higher hierarchical position. Issues are, in other words constantly delegated upwards in the 
hierarchy.  
 
In contrast to this the salespeople perceive a lack of influence and feel that they are left out of the 
decision-making and that there is limited transparency within the hierarchy. When asked about 
influence, the answers varied. Some organizational members felt that it worked perfectly and that 
they do not want to, and perhaps should not have a bigger part in the decision-making, but the 
majority perceived a lack of influence over processes and decisions. Most organizational members 
also described a substantial lack of top-down feedback on ideas and opinions. Even though 
meetings are organized by Blutex where discussion is allowed, several organizational members 
perceived that they did not have a forum to discuss ideas and opinions.  
 
We have noticed during our interviews that middle managers serve as a filter in the internal 
communication and that it is up to their judgment to evaluate whether an idea is worth proceeding 
with or not. This leads to a situation where ideas and suggestions which are not connected to the 
result, seldom are brought to the attention of the top management: 
 
“If it doesn’t benefit the business it only brings a lot of extra work that leads 
nowhere. With that I think we [as managers] have gotten pretty far. We’re good at 
making judgments and interpret what should be invested in and not. (...) You have to 
look at ‘Ok, who is this benefitting?’ and once again to look at the client’s need and 
then you base the decision on that. Because if it doesn’t generate money in the end 
then… ‘nice-to-have’ is nothing to put effort and time on.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
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Having described the context of our case study company, we now move on to describing the top 
management’s problematization. 
 
4.1.3. Top management’s problematization 
 
“The culture at Blutex today is very much built upon a ‘price index-mentality’, rather 
than adding value to the customer (...). Looking from the business culture 
perspective, this change of mindset is a giant leap for most people working at Blutex” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
Top management states in their problematization that resistance to change is rather common 
among organizational members of the salesforce. It is believed that these members, who are 
described as usually a bit older, who have been in the company for a long time, either will not or 
cannot change - or in worst case scenario, both. Top management emphasizes the value of having 
employees with a positive attitude, especially in times of change: 
 
“You need to find people that have an open mind, people who are ready on a daily 
basis to challenge the way how one does the work. (...) So step by step, we need to 
add more of these people who are open for change.” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
In conclusion, we have in our interviews with managers depicted two opposite descriptions of 
salespeople’s characteristics. On the one hand, the older employee who is described in terms of 
resistance and negativity, and on the other hand, the more attractive open-minded employee who 
is positive, compliant  and ‘open for change’. In our interviews the organizational members of 
Blutex have shared their social realities, which we have analyzed through sensemaking theory in 
order to get an understanding of what is perceived as resistance by the top management.  
 
4.2. Perceptions and Behavior 
In this section, we will present the perceptions of the organizational members regarding ‘Vision 
2020’, ‘Solution Selling’ and how those have affected their behavior.  
 
4.2.1. Perceptions  
Our empirical material lead us to believe that there is a common understanding of ‘Vision 2020’; 
not only in terms of its definition and meaning but also in terms of a collective positive response. 
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In other words, middle managers and salespeople were positive to the formulation of ‘Vision 
2020’, both affectively and cognitively: 
 
 “Let me put it this way; finally - something happens! (...) I’m not interested in 
striking bargains, Blutex was in that position ten years ago. We’re supposed to turn 
this ship around, to become a more professional communication company. (...) 
Lately, I’ve had that feeling of; ‘wow, things are really happening now’.”  
Sales person, Blutex 
 
Organizational members agree that Blutex needs to change and that ‘Vision 2020’ is an 
appropriate goal. ‘Vision 2020’ is however still only a vision and has not yet been specified and 
developed into a strategy. A top manager explains: 
 
“We have a general strategy nowadays, we call it vision 2020. It’s more a kind of 
visionary statement; where we want to be. Now we have started to work it through 
and I believe that during this year we will step by step create a clear strategy from it. 
(…) [Today] it is not formulated in a way that I recognize a strategy. But that has been 
a bit of Blutex’s culture and [management] style as well; strategy isn’t communicated 
as clearly as other companies do it.” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
‘Vision 2020’ is mainly promoted in financial figures and strategic visions. The change is 
communicated in terms of how the business model of Blutex needs to change, rather than how 
the salespeople need to change their behavior. So far, the top management has communicated 
where Blutex is headed but not how the organizational members should change in order to get 
there. The change is thereby described vaguely both because of the organizational culture and that 
there at this point is no formulated strategy to communicate.  
 
Altogether, the general opinion of ‘Vision 2020’ is positive, both cognitively and affectively. 
Considering the top management’s problematization, we had expected a less positive attitude 
towards the strategic change. Even more surprisingly from this aspect was the overall positive 
attitude towards the concept of ‘Solution Selling’.  
 
“‘Solution Selling’ is what we should be doing - it’s totally the right thing to do!” 
Sales person, Blutex 
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Organizational members agree that ‘Solution Selling’ is a good selling method and an appropriate 
initiative. Furthermore, there has been no experienced confusion on the individual level in terms 
of ambiguities or uncertainties regarding the concept: 
 
“I understand the concept, what Blutex wants and I think it’s very good. (...) and 
what’s most important is that the top management has shared its vision, its strategy 
and its goals and really has tried to communicate it to every single employee. That, I 
think is extraordinary! Because that’s what you want as an employee; to have clear 
visions, strategies and goals.” 
Sales person, Blutex 
 
In contrast to the top management’s problematization, the change is thereby not perceived as a 
“giant leap”. Instead, the general opinion seems to be that the concept of ‘Solution Selling’ is 
rather self-explanatory and that they do not perceive this as something new. Most interviewees 
however mention that ‘Solution Selling’ might be a bigger change for other salespersons than 
themselves. This perception made us interested in how the change program came to change their 
behavior. 
 
4.2.2. Behavior 
When talking about how ‘Solution Selling’ affects the organizational members’ behavior, 
salespeople are quite unanimous. They claim that selling solutions is not something new and that 
most of them even claim to have been working like this ever since they started working at Blutex. 
In order words, it is ‘business as usual’. The aim of the program is therefore perceived, not as a 
way of changing behavior, but rather to give some kind of collective framework for the whole 
organization and thereby get the organization moving in the same direction: 
 
“[Top management] told us about this program when we had a conference and I 
find it rather peculiar when they during the conference tell us to go from selling 
products to selling services, considering that most of the salespeople - at least the 
relatively new ones - always have been working with selling services and never within 
product sales. You get a bit confused.” 
Sales person, Blutex 
 
The interpretation that the top management has implemented a large and grandiose change 
program where most of the participants do not need to change, has led to that the salespeople 
come to their own conclusions. Some state that the top management simply do not know why 
they are implementing it, whilst others saw it as a collective program with the goal to implement a 
common selling method. We asked a top manager whether a majority of the salespeople are 
already selling according to ‘Solution Selling’ or not: 
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“No, they are not in real life. (...) That’s how we are built as a human, especially if 
you look at the traditional salesperson. They have high self-confidence, they are very 
competitive, very talkative and normally have good communication skills. These 
people normally want to feel that ‘I’ve done this all the time’. That is protecting their 
personality as well. I’m more interested in the people who are saying; ‘Well this is 
interesting - let’s see where this leads’. (...) [When people say ‘this is already what we 
do’] for me it means that these people are difficult to get onboard. (...) [But] I am 
happy that we have more and more of these people who come with curiosity.” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
What we soon discovered however was that the actual definition of ‘Solution Selling’ fluctuated a 
lot between individuals at Blutex. We were confused, both regarding the change program’s actual 
definition but also over the fragmented understanding of the one and same concept.  
 
4.3. What is ‘Solution Selling’?   
The interpretations of ‘Solution Selling’ were fragmented. Several organizational members 
interpreted it literally, whilst others defined it as getting closer to the clients, being proactive and 
building relations. Some organizational members defined it as a kind of upselling, i.e. selling 
something additional or more expensive, in order to make a more profitable sale. One middle 
manager focused very much on the internal routines, where ‘Solution Selling’ would increase 
managerial control through technical control mechanisms by increasing the usage of the new 
CRM systems and feedback processes. In conclusion, most organizational members seemed to 
focus on the first part of the official definition; that it is the combination of products and services 
that makes a solution: 
 
“‘Solution Selling’ - combine products and services into communication solutions 
that adds value to our customer’s needs”  
Teaching material 2013, Blutex 
 
However, our last interview shed light on the matter from a different angle. The middle manager 
we interviewed had already been educated in the original American ‘Solution Selling’ program 
with a previous employer. For the first time, an interviewee focused solely on the latter part of the 
definition; to add value to the customer’s needs: 
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“You could sell sand with the ‘Solution Selling’ technique. In that case it would be 
more like; ‘What is the sand for? What is it a solution for?’ and then talk about the 
value of what you do with the sand instead of just selling a pile of sand. That is what 
‘Solution Selling’ is about, in my opinion.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
So the intended definition of ‘Solution Selling’ seemed to be, not to literally sell solutions but a 
method of describing the value of a solution and pricing it accordingly - regardless if the solution 
consists of products or services. We find it remarkable that it is possible to have such a diversity of 
interpretations and definitions of what ‘Solution Selling’ is in the same organization. Our last 
interviewee continues to explain: 
 
“The thing is, the salespeople have only had [the first training session] and what you 
have in this education as well is this movement of becoming a communication 
solution company. And because of this, the focus has been on cultural change really, 
and I would argue that within [the program] they haven't dealt with what ‘Solution 
Selling’ is.  It has been touched upon, but not to an extent where it has affected how 
we sell” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
The fact that the implementation process is not yet finished may serve as a simple answer to why 
people have interpreted the concept of ‘Solution Selling’ differently. However, we are interested 
in analyzing how and why people come to conclusions at this early stage since it affects their 
behavior and their future interpretations in the change process. How is it, that some perceive 
‘Solution Selling’ as a control system tool whilst others perceive it as selling combinations of 
different services rather than products - and that everyone regardless of definition are certain 
about their interpretations at this early stage of the implementation? 
 
4.4. Summary 
To sum up, all the organizational members agree on the change process’ importance and approve 
of ‘Vision 2020’ and they also believe that ‘Solution Selling’ is an appropriate method for selling 
the new product portfolio. Salespeople and middle managers are excited over the top 
management’s change initiative, to move from the old mindset to a more trendy sales method.   
 
One of our most critical finding was that hardly anyone within the salesforce viewed ‘Solution 
Selling’ as something new. Organizational members had the perception that they were selling 
according to ‘Solution Selling’ and have been doing so for a long period of time. Therefore the 
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behavior of the salesforce was bound not to change, people thought however that others than 
themselves probably needed to change.  
 
This raises the question whether it is the described diversity of interpretations that the top 
management perceives as resistance to change. It also takes us back to our initial research 
question how consensus could exist at the same time as the organizational members have such a 
diversity of interpretation of a common event. Regardless of which, we have in addition identified 
a perceived ‘gap’ between the salespeople and the top management, based on a mutual 
skepticism. This gap will be analyzed with the theory of sensemaking in the next chapter; what it 
really consists of, how and why it has been created and what consequences it might bring. 
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5. Analysis 
In this chapter we will use the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 to explain and analyze 
our empirical material. The chapter is divided into three parts, where we in the first part analyze 
the sensemaking process chronologically on the three hierarchical levels. In the second part, we 
discuss the factors which have contributed to the way the organizational members made sense 
from a holistic perspective. At last, we sum up the results of our analysis in the third and final part. 
Our goal is to depict the complex relationship between communication and change, as a way of 
showing how communication is more than a ‘vehicle for information’ in a change process.  
 
5.1. Making Sense of Solution Selling 
How come that the organizational members of Blutex have interpreted ‘Solution Selling’ so 
differently? How is it possible to have consensus in a change process when the interpretations 
differ among the organizational members? In the following sections we will step by step interpret 
Blutex’s sensemaking process by applying our theoretical model from chapter 3; how cues are 
connected to frames. In other words, we will illustrate how some of the interviewees have made 
sense of the communicated change process on a micro level. We start by analyzing the top 
management’s sensegiving of ‘Solution Selling’. 
 
5.1.1. Top Managers Gave Sense 
The introduction of ‘Solution Selling’ during a big sales conference in September 2012 is one of 
the most critical events of Blutex’s collective sensemaking process. It was during this event that the 
top management for the first time gave sense officially of ‘Solution Selling’ at an organizational 
level. It was also during this event that several organizational members made an initial 
interpretation of the concept. However, due to the fact that the top management not only 
included the ‘Solution Selling’ education in the change program, but also a cultural change 
initiative along with a new CRM system, the cues for ‘Solution Selling’ were mixed with other 
cues.  
 
We argue that this also has affected the sensemaking of Blutex’s organizational members. We 
believe that it becomes more difficult to discern from where mixed cues originate if they are 
communicated vaguely. Two cues can become equivocal if believed to have the same origin. To 
exemplify; if a cue regarding the cultural change is mistaken for a cue regarding ‘Solution Selling’, 
that cue might contradict connections previously made regarding ‘Solution Selling’. This 
contradiction may then cause the sensemaker to break the previous connections and instead try to 
make sense of the cues in another way. In Blutex’s case, mixing cues made sensemaking within 
the salesforce problematic as the top management was vague in its communication (i.e. 
ambiguous). We will in the next sections analyze two examples of top management ambiguity by 
looking at the equivocalities regarding the encouragement of feedback and the view on proactivity.  
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Before we continue our analysis we would like to stress that we have not taken any standpoint 
regarding the strategic aspects of Blutex. We have for instance not analyzed whether Blutex’ 
should be proactive or not. We simply have depicted the causes and consequences for sending 
out ambiguous cues in a context like Blutex’s. 
 
The first cues to be analyzed regard how critical thinking and feedback are on the one hand 
described as crucial, but on the other hand systematically discouraged in some parts of the 
organization. Blutex’s CEO states that bottom-up feedback is wanted, but according to our 
analysis negative feedback or feedback that does not necessarily lead to increased revenue is to a 
large extent neglected within Blutex. Organizational members experience a low level of 
transparency and influence. Still, to be more entrepreneurial and to constantly develop Blutex as 
an organization is encouraged and is described as desirable in the process of becoming more 
professional. Top management states for instance that Blutex needs open-minded people who are 
‘open for change’ and who are ready to “challenge the way how one does the work” in order to 
change. In practice however, the organizational culture and structures hinder a lot of the internal 
bottom-up feedback. 
 
We have for instance seen in the empirical material how the organizational culture is described as 
being “a very top-down organization with quite authoritarian leadership” where most people feel 
that they do not have a forum for sharing opinions or criticizing existing working methods. 
According to Johansson and Heide (2008b) managers often accept positive feedback and embrace 
it without hesitation but are often surprised and displeased when receiving negative feedback. 
Even though allowing criticism and getting the opinions of the employees are regarded as 
important when implementing change, this is generally something perceived as unpleasant for 
managers. Tourish (2005) states that criticism upwards in organizations is seldom encouraged in 
change processes, even though employees are able to contribute to the change process itself. The 
importance of an open communication climate is thus often stated as important by top managers, 
but is neglected just as often in practice (Johansson and Heide, 2008b). We will discuss Blutex’s 
internal communication climate and its implications further in chapter 5.2.2. 
 
Our second example of equivocal cues is the encouragement of becoming more proactive. Part of 
the top management’s problematization is that the salesforce at Blutex need to become more 
proactive in their mindset and daily work. The proactivity is often promoted as being one of the 
most essential parts of the new working methods and the culture. However, we would argue that 
the top management’s attitude towards ‘being proactive’ is equivocal and even contradictory since 
(a) the individual definitions of proactivity among the top managers differ, not only from each 
other but also from the concept’s common definition, (b) the salesforce have no incentives in 
practice for being proactive and are even told to be reactive by the managers, and (c) the top 
management does not think that Blutex is, or even should be proactive from a strategic point of 
view. The way of promoting proactivity as a core value and then actively discourage proactive 
initiatives ought to be counter-productive if the goal actually is to change the culture and identity 
towards being more proactive. 
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Let us start by deciphering the concept of being proactive. Oxford dictionary defines a proactive 
person or action as; “creating or controlling a situation rather than just responding to it after it has 
happened” (oxforddictionaries.com, 2013) whereas reactive is defined as; “acting in response to a 
situation rather than creating or controlling it” (oxforddictionaries.com, 2013).  In other words, as 
a proactive company, manager or salesperson you ought to take the initiative and drive the change 
and development forward rather than acting upon others’ demands or wishes. Blutex defines 
proactivity as: 
 
“Constantly developing the business relationship with the customer and creating the 
most competitive communication” 
Teaching material 2013, Blutex 
 
Focus is on constant development and creativity and at first glance the Blutex definition seems to 
align with the common definition. However, when ‘being proactive’ is translated into the context 
specific work process it becomes equivocal: 
 
“The Work Process of Proactivity – ‘I work efficiently and deliver quality’” 
Teaching material 2013, Blutex 
 
We would argue that working ‘efficiently and deliver quality’ is quite different from being creative, 
and even contradictory when it comes to allowing mistakes and risk-taking. In an internal 
promotion text for ‘Vision 2020’ proactivity and its context is formulated as follows: 
 
“In a business where change is constant and constantly accelerating, proactivity is the 
key to success. It goes without saying that for us as a company as well as for you and 
me as employees, we must never lose our entrepreneurial spirit. It means that we’re 
never totally satisfied – what is good can always be better. Regardless of [your 
position] never stop questioning the way things have been done. 
Teaching material 2013, Blutex 
 
Once again, we would like to point out that working ‘efficiently and deliver quality’ is difficult if 
you at the same time should have a proactive ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ where you are encouraged to 
stretch the limits of what is possible today by trying new things in a new way. In addition, top 
managers are not very encouraging to being entrepreneurial and pushing the limits: 
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“I wouldn’t bet my money on that [that Blutex should be in a front-end position, 
defining the industry] (...) Our nature, organization culture is not like that. We are 
more ‘doers’ than ‘thinkers’ or ‘visionaries’.” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
Top managers describe how Blutex traditionally has stretched the limits too far in terms of 
providing unique solutions for every customer. The strategy of today is more about providing 
modified rather than unique solutions and by doing so also gain economies of scale. Top 
managers stress the importance of listening and adapting to the customers’ needs rather than 
suggesting solutions which risk not being sold. The CEO at Blutex sees this as a crucial part of the 
sales process; to be proactive by doing research of the customers’ needs. The CEO compares it to 
how the top management at Blutex reacts as a customer when a supplier approaches Blutex with a 
new service that is not needed. 
 
“They [the supplier] haven’t adapted. They haven’t done their homework, and when 
we become like that; ‘this is Blutex’s concept and this is our solution’, and the 
customer says; ‘well, we don’t need that’. I mean, we simply can never get in that 
situation, not as long as I’m here, because if we do - then we’re screwed long-term, so 
to speak.” 
Q: But isn’t that proactivity? I mean, proactivity is defined by the fact that you try to 
push the development forward, to try to find new stuff that the customer didn’t know 
of - and as a part of that risk a ‘no thank you’? 
“But I think that has to do with different starting-points. (...) We will never be a 
research company. We will never be the ones who present a brand new IT-solution 
or a cloud solution. We are not the ones capable of doing that kind of stuff. What 
we need to do is to use existing technique in different ways. (...) We are not a 
pharmaceutical company who are involved in basic research or anything like that - 
we will never be. Others can do that.” 
CEO, Blutex 
 
Here the context specific view on proactivity is defined by the CEO. Being proactive in Blutex is 
not the same as being proactive in a pharmaceutical company. Focus is more on listening to the 
customers’ needs and in most cases where new solutions are developed they are done so in 
collaboration with a customer. 
 
We would also argue that the view on proactivity within the top management group is ambiguous. 
Not only do the definitions differ but also whether Blutex is, or even should be proactive: 
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“I would say [Blutex’s change process] is reactive. I know there will be disagreement, 
and mostly from the CEO, but my view is that we are reactive – we are not proactive. 
We believe, and we would like to be proactive, and in many cases we want to believe 
that we are, but in real life [we are not]. (...) We are a fairly traditional company and 
we do proactive things inside what we already know, and what’s already developed 
and already exist – there we are fairly proactive. But are we a company that really 
creates something totally new or leads the industry to new fields? No, we are not 
such a company – and I’m not sure if we should be such a company.” 
Top manager, Blutex 
 
It seems as if the top management agrees upon what kind of company Blutex has been 
traditionally and what kind of strategy is most appropriate today and in the future. What differs is 
the way the individual top managers define proactivity compared to the promoted ‘official’ 
definition, thus resulting in the depicted ambiguity in terms of contradictory cues. An interesting 
part of this is that the top managers did not share the benefits of being proactive, the way it is 
defined by the printed teaching material. Rather they referred to the organizational benefits in 
terms of being reactive; an organizational strength that is grounded in the company’s tradition, 
core values and identity. 
 
Larson and Tompkins (2005) state that top managers who are not entirely convinced of a change 
process’ benefits, tend to look at the traditional values in a change process. This could have 
substantial consequences, especially in a top-down implementation. The authors conclude that 
top managers may, directly or indirectly sabotage their own change initiatives by communicating 
ambiguous messages. Co-workers quickly notice this ambiguity whereby they become skeptic 
towards the change.  
 
In the case of Blutex we have seen how the ambiguous messages have created skepticism, but not 
because the organizational members have noticed the ambiguity. Rather, the salespeople’s 
skepticism in the case of Blutex is foremost grounded in the perception that top managers do not 
know how the salespeople are working; a perception which we see as a result of top managers’ 
ambiguous communication. This type of skepticism among the salesforce contributes to what the 
top management perceives as resistance, hence Larson and Tompkins’ conclusions do not serve 
as an explanation for the ‘mystery’ of the positive consensus among the organizational members at 
Blutex. 
 
Altogether, the limitations of being proactive and stretching the limits within Blutex are quite 
narrow. This leads us into the next problematic aspect of Blutex’s promoted proactivity; the lack 
of the incentives and encouragement for being proactive. A majority of the salesforce concluded 
that their biggest priority is to be reliable; to be able to deliver what you have promised in a 
flawless manner. In other words, to “work efficiently and deliver quality”. Some managers said 
that they try to encourage their staff to be more proactive by allowing mistakes to a certain extent. 
Others did not have any tolerance for situations where the salesperson stretched the limits ‘too 
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far’ in terms of promising a solution that they may not be able to deliver. In addition, there are no 
particular incentives for being proactive or to try new ideas, concepts, or methods. Instead, the 
only described incentive was the commission-based salary. A salesperson describes how this 
affects his/her choices in terms of pushing the limits, being efficient, and deliver quality: 
 
“I know I have a budget, which I know I have to reach. Then I have to focus on that, 
on the right things. I shouldn’t invest a lot of time and energy in stuff where I get 
nothing back. The customer gets really happy, but what do I get? Nothing. I sell 
services that we are able to deliver. If I invest my time in that, then I reach my budget 
and everyone gets happy. We [Blutex] get the result we want. So even if we have a 
‘Solution Selling’ mindset, you got to focus on investing your time in the right stuff. 
Sales person, Blutex 
 
The incentive system is aligned with the instructions of working proactively - “efficiently and 
deliver quality” - and also with the top management strategic goal of gaining economies of scale. 
We would however argue that the incentive system counteracts the ambition to become more 
proactive - if proactivity is defined as Blutex’s official definition; “[To] constantly develop the 
business relationship with the customer and create the most competitive communication”. In the 
next section we will have a closer look at the sensemaking process of the middle managers. 
 
5.1.2. Middle Managers Made Sense 
We find the hierarchical group of middle managers interesting to study, since they are both 
sensemakers and sensegivers. We are interested in how the top management’s sensegiving has 
affected the middle managers’ sensemaking and how they have given sense of the change process 
to the salespeople. According to our analysis, the middle managers all made sense in different 
ways. Their interpretations were fragmented and they had different views on what it is to work 
according to ‘Solution Selling’. We will now continue by analyzing how and why this happened for 
each of the middle managers we interviewed. 
 
5.1.2.1. Middle Manager 1 
Middle manager 1 is the middle manager mentioned in section 4.3. He/she had previously 
attended a ‘Solution Selling’ education and had an idea of what ‘Solution Selling’ was from the 
start. In other words; middle manager 1 had already built up a solid frame for ‘Solution Selling’ 
during the previous occasion. Now when the rather sparse and vague information about ‘Solution 
Selling’ came to him/her from the top management at Blutex, it was sufficient for middle manager 
1 to connect it to his/her pre-existing frame. And since the connection was made immediately 
middle manager 1 never started the sensemaking process. Noteworthy is that middle manager 1 
also distinguished that the ‘Solution Selling’ program at Blutex included more than just the 
‘Solution Selling’ concept. Because middle manager 1 had a very clear picture of what ‘Solution 
Selling’ was at the time he/she received the cues, he/she was also able to see that some of the cues 
for Blutex’s ‘Solution Selling’ program did not fit with his/her pre-existing frame. He/she thus 
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noticed the mixed cues mentioned in section 5.1.1.. Middle manager 1 described how the 
program also includes elements such as setting individual goals for salespersons, goals for the 
whole organization and do follow-up by reporting into the new CRM-system, as well as to get a 
mutual understanding of the sales process in Blutex. 
 
Middle manager 1 stated that some people in the organization perhaps never will understand what 
‘Solution Selling’ really is and he/she exemplified this by saying that some organizational members 
may interpret ‘Solution Selling’ as ‘wining and dining’ and building relationships with clients. But, 
he/she continued to explain that those things are ‘relationship management’ which is an important 
precondition to selling solutions, but it is not ‘Solution Selling’. Tragicomically enough, this is the 
connection and interpretation that middle manager 2 made. 
 
5.1.2.2. Middle Manager 2 
 
“For me, Solution Selling is actually about starting to listen to the customer even 
more. I believe it is about having salespeople out with the clients and learn the 
business; to keep or to create new customer relations”. 
Middle manager 2, Blutex 
 
Middle manager 2 has, as presumed by middle manager 1, made the interpretation that the 
program is about building relations and working closer to the clients. Middle manager 2 was 
convinced that his/her group of salespeople have been working with ‘Solution Selling’ for many 
years, i.e. finding out what the customer needs and combining services and products into solutions 
that fit the specific customer. We believe that this interpretation has been made due to middle 
manager 2 connecting the ‘Solution Selling’ cues to a pre-existing frame. As the cue was vague, 
there were no obvious frame for it and perhaps there were many plausible frames that it could be 
connected to. In addition, as new cues were coming slowly, it was easier to just connect ‘Solution 
Selling’ cues to an already pre-existing frame. As we stated in our theoretical framework, people 
want to understand things they are affected by as quickly as possible and because of this there is 
an emotional pressure on the individual to connect the cue to a frame (Weick, 1995). People 
might then instead connect the cues to the frame that makes sense the most and is most affectively 
comfortable (i.e. the frame that feels best). For middle manager 2 the frame that felt best was 
apparently one that implied that ‘Solution Selling’ is close to what they are already doing and that 
the improvement can be accomplished by doing what they are already doing, just a little more; i.e. 
“listening to the customer even more”. This is an emotionally convenient way to interpret 
‘Solution Selling’. According to Törestad and Nystedt (1994) individuals interpret situations from 
what they hope will happen. And because the cues were vague and came at a low frequency, this 
interpretation was not contradicted before it was already reinforced; a phenomenon we will refer 
to as ‘cementing a connection’. 
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Cementing is not described in detail in the sensemaking literature. Mumby’s (1988) quote, stating 
that “communication is the process through which meaning is created and, over time, 
sedimented” (1988:15) would however suggest that meaning (i.e. connections) are somehow 
cemented. The following quote from Weick (1995) would also suggest that when an initial 
connection has been made, future sensemaking is hampered: “The feeling of order, clarity and 
rationality is an important goal of sensemaking, which means that once this feeling is achieved, 
further retrospective processing [sensemaking] stops” (Weick, 1995:29). 
 
We would like to suggest that after the individual has made sense, he/she does not enter the 
sensemaking process again until a new cue diverges significantly from the frame that the other 
cues have been connected to. Instead, the new cues are being instantly connected to the same 
frame as the other cues, thereby reinforcing the connection and thus the interpretation. This may 
further lead to contradicting cues being disregarded as the cemented connection is a base for new 
expectations, which in turn serve as strong filter of inputs (Weick, 1995). We believe that the 
more cemented a connection is, the harder it is to break that connection and connect the cues to 
another frame. The main reason for this is that the sensemaker is also forced to question his/her 
social reality.  
 
 
5.1.2.3. Middle Manager 3 
Middle manager 3 was an interesting interview because we were given a very detailed portrayal of 
how he/she made sense during the various phases of the change process. Middle manager 3 
described how he/she at first did not understand the cue, and did not directly make a connection 
either: 
 
“At first, I had no idea what Solution Selling was.” 
Middle manager 3, Blutex 
 
Middle manager 3 continues by explaining the first hours of introduction: 
 
“I [was asked] a question after a couple of hours; ‘What is this?’ [to which I 
responded]; ‘Well, it’s a bit early for me to say (...). Let’s keep going for a couple of 
hours  and we’ll see where it lands’ because in that moment I had a certain picture of 
it, but then it started to be presented in another way which made me go; ‘All right! 
This is what they mean’” 
Middle manager 3, Blutex 
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Here we can see that middle manager 3 still had the cue hanging, in other words, the connection 
had not yet been made. Middle manager 3 was at the ‘categorization phase’ in the framework we 
presented in section 3.3.9. still waiting for further cues in order to get a better picture of what 
frame to connect them to or if he/she needed to use them to build a whole new frame. What kind 
of emotions middle manager 3 had at this point is difficult to analyze from our interview, but since 
he/she was waiting patiently, not making hasty presumptions or fast connections, we argue that this 
indicates that middle manager 3 was keen on making the ‘correct’ interpretation as he later is to 
mediate this to his/her subordinates. Middle manager 3 mentioned that he/she “had a certain 
picture” which implies that middle manager 3 had made some kind idea of a preliminary 
connection. When it then “started to be presented in another way” those subsequent cues were 
contradicting that connection whereby middle manager 3 instead found a better connection and 
finally implied that he/she had made sense. But let us dwell upon this phase before moving on. 
Middle manager 3 went into further detail about his/her interpretations at another time in the 
interview: 
 
“My mindset from the beginning was that [‘Solution Selling’] was probably just about 
looking at solution based selling, and I thought; ‘Haven’t we been doing that for ten 
years? There is nothing new about that’. (...) It was first when they started to present 
it in a [way directly addressed to the salesforce]; to follow up with consequences; ‘this 
is what is expected of you as middle managers, because this is what we expect from 
the salespeople’. Then you started to realize: ‘Ah, it is not a way to approach 
customers, but a way how to manage sales internally at Blutex”. And this happened 
the first day.” 
Middle manager 3, Blutex 
 
Something worth noting is that middle manager 3 had just as the salespeople come to the initial 
conclusion that “this is what we already do”. He did however not stop at that interpretation as 
opposed to the salespeople. We believe this is due to the pressure from the top management as 
well as his/her own expectations. As implied by Mailloux (1990); power and political interests play 
an important part in determining what frame you connect a cue to. Middle manager 3 is supposed 
to be a change agent for his/her subordinates and the top management wants to see change. We 
therefore believe that middle manager 3 expected more from the education and was looking for 
something concrete to implement at his/her group of salespeople. It was first when the program’s 
direct effects on the salesforce were described to middle manager 2 that he/she made a 
connection. This triggered an emotion of relief, because the cues could finally be connected to a 
frame and be interpreted. So instead of the previous presumption that ‘Solution Selling’ was 
literally about selling solutions, which made no sense to middle manager 3 (since it did not result 
in any change to present to the top management), he/she instead grasped the internal 
management elements full heartedly. Middle manager 3 elaborates: 
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“[‘Solution Selling’] is actually more about a mindset; what kind of requirements you 
have, which gives you possibilities to process the market effectively, but also process 
my colleagues - by doing follow up” 
Middle manager 3, Blutex 
 
Middle manager 3 has made the interpretation that ‘Solution Selling’ is about changing the 
mindset of the salesforce and for him/her to monitor the operations by doing follow up, using the 
CRM-system. This is a case of plausibility; one out of Weick’s (1995) seven properties. The point 
Weick makes is that it does not matter whether the connection is the correct one or not, because 
it might be. Weick (1995) uses a quote from Garfinkel (1967) when he/she explains the idea that 
plausibility is more important than accuracy in sensemaking: ”If the interpretation makes good 
sense, then that’s what happened” (Garfinkel, 1967:106). 
 
The next quote illustrates how a weak connection (i.e. a new one) is cemented when further cues 
do not disconfirm it. To cement a connection new cues do not need to confirm the connection, it 
is simply enough that they do not disconfirm it. For middle manager 3 this happened during the 
second implementation phase. 
 
“Now, in phase 2 last week it all became crystal clear what it is all about; a method 
and a way of processing the market in an effective manner where we can follow up, 
and help the salespeople to work more organized and structured” 
Middle manager 3, Blutex 
 
Even though middle manager 3 has interpreted ‘Solution Selling’ differently than the top 
management intended, he/she finds the connection being confirmed even though it most 
probably is a case of non-disconfirmation. We argue that when new cues do not disconfirm a 
connection, the cementation of the connection instead creates a feeling of confirmation. We will 
now move on to the analysis of how the salesforce made sense of the given cues. 
 
5.1.3. Salespeople Made Sense 
The salespeople made sense in very similar ways and their interpretations of ‘Solution Selling’ 
ended up in basically the same conclusion; that ‘Solution Selling’ is what they, as individuals 
already do:  
 
“I believe that I already have a ‘Solution Selling’ methodology (...) What they [the 
top managers] are trying to do now, is to make everyone think and act alike” 
Salesperson, Blutex 
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We argue that most of the salespeople have not really done any sensemaking. Instead, they have 
connected the new cues directly to pre-existing frames. Rather than waiting for further cues, they 
have made connections hastily which have led to a simplified and almost literal interpretation of 
‘Solution Selling’: 
 
“[‘Solution Selling’] is much about, well as the name implies; finding solutions for 
our clients instead of products more or less. Using our range of products to find the 
optimal solution for the clients, moving away from the old way of thinking in terms 
of products.” 
Salesperson, Blutex 
 
What has happened here is that the salespeople have been interrupted in their daily work by the 
new cues from ‘Solution Selling’. This triggers emotion. As stated in our theoretical framework 
the emotion is at first bound to be negative since this interruption complicates their daily activities 
as it takes up time and focus (Weick, 1995). And this emotion affects the connections they make 
later. Most salespeople jumped to conclusions relatively fast instead of waiting for further cues. 
We therefore argue that the emotional level among the salespeople was high since negative 
emotion causes pressure on the individual to connect the cues to a frame as quickly as possible, in 
order to circumvent or get rid of the interruption (Weick, 1995). 
 
In this case we mean that the interruption was circumvented by making the interpretation that ‘this 
is already what we do’. What becomes apparent is that, if everyone shares this point of view then 
no one will actually change behaviorally, even though everybody agrees cognitively that ‘Solution 
Selling’ is the way to go. We believe that this serves as another explanation for the perceived 
resistance which is described in the top management’s problematization.  
 
When the salespeople were asked in retrospect if there had been any confusion to begin with 
regarding the program or the concept, most people would not agree: 
 
“Confusion is a strong word I would say, but sure. Before we had the first 
[education] opportunity you didn’t really know what it was, what it would include, 
and so on. But I wouldn’t say confusion.” 
Q: From the time when they started to talk about [‘Solution Selling’] and explain 
what it was, have you experienced any ambiguities then? 
“No... No, I wouldn’t say that. Solution Selling kind of speaks for itself, I think.” 
Q: Sure. 
“Right? It’s enormous, it could be anything as well. Ehm...” 
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Q: That’s what I’m thinking, it’s a pretty wide concept. 
“Yeah, sure but I think it makes sense now after we had the first [education] 
opportunity... the first lectures.” 
Salesperson, Blutex 
 
Confusion seems to be a word that the salesperson is unwilling to use when describing his/her 
personal sensemaking. We imagine that this is first and foremost because they have not actually 
done any sensemaking since they made interpretations rather hastily. Secondly, confusion may be 
viewed as a negatively loaded word which implies that you have not understood the 
communicated message. This in particular when all your colleagues seem to have understood it 
from the start. 
 
Another interesting part here is the last but one line where the salesperson contradicts him-
/herself by saying that on the one hand there were no confusion, but on the other hand ‘Solution 
Selling’ could be “anything as well”. When this is pointed out to him/her the salesperson simply 
shrugs it off. As the salesperson starts giving sense to him-/herself, the salesperson also starts to 
realize that it might be more to ‘Solution Selling’ than just the literal meaning. However as we 
stated before; having been able to connect the cues to a frame is emotionally relieving. If this act 
of sensegiving would have continued the salesperson might have come to new conclusions and 
therefore had to detach those cues that were previously connected to the ‘wrong’ frame. We 
suggest that this is an example of how people actively may want to avoid making sense in order to 
preserve their social reality, by avoiding giving sense and perhaps even disregarding cues that do 
not fit with the pre-existing frame. 
 
The quote above is also an example of how sensegiving completes Gioia and Chittipeddi’s (1991) 
loop of the sensemaking process, as it initiates another. In other words, the salesperson is 
approached by a new uncategorized cue (“it could be anything as well”), that was created by him-
/herself when the salesperson tried to make sense of the old cue (“Solution Selling speaks for 
itself”). 
 
5.2. Analytical Discussion 
The sensemaking process of ‘Solution Selling’ has been built on vague cues and equivocal 
formulations according to our analysis. What is interesting is that most of the communicated cues 
have been perceived by the organizational members as both comprehensible and strategically 
appropriate. Few of our interviewees have experienced confusion, but as we have seen in the 
empirical material the understandings and interpretations are diverse and hardly anyone has 
interpreted ‘Solution Selling’ as intended by the top management. We believe that this 
encapsulates the paradoxical effects of being ambiguous; that unclear cues may result in a 
perceived consensus. We will elaborate this paradox in the next section, whereas the latter part of 
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this chapter will discuss the implications of Blutex’s lack of collective frames and its 
communication climate. 
 
5.2.1. Strategic Ambiguity 
We would argue that the level of clarity is not necessarily connected to the communication 
competences of the top management. In fact, it may very well be the opposite. Some scholars 
(Eisenberg, 1984; Weick and Browning, 1986) argue that communicating vaguely or unclear 
could be used as a strategy for reaching consensus in a change process. This strategy is referred to 
as ‘strategic ambiguity’. The purpose of being strategically ambiguous is to allow flexibility and 
creativity on an individual level within a common organizational change process. Eisenberg (1984) 
for instance see it as a way of managing Kant’s classical goal of “maximum individuality within 
maximum community” (1984:233). The strategic ambiguity thus aims to guard the organizational 
members from accepting one organizational reality. Eisenberg further states that “clarity is only a 
measure of communicative competence if the individual has as his or her goal to be clear” 
(1984:231) and that strategic ambiguity very well could lead to a state of “unified diversity”. Weick 
and Browning (1986) conclude that maintained ambiguity is helpful in change processes since 
“people are able to retain their differences of opinion under the guise of consensus” (1986:254). 
Instead of concretizing organizational goals, missions and plans, the strategic ambiguity allows 
different groups to apply different interpretations to common organizational symbols. In the case 
of Blutex, we have seen how a unified diversity has been created through the diverse 
interpretations of ‘Solution Selling’. The grandiose ‘Vision 2020’ could in this sense be viewed as 
a common symbol which affectively creates consensus and at the same time allows different 
cognitive interpretations of ‘Solution Selling’.  
 
In the case of ‘Vision 2020’ and ‘Solution Selling’ we have identified insecurity among top 
managers over what traditional values to keep and what to change in Blutex’s new culture, identity, 
and strategy. We believe that the ambiguous cues given by the top management mainly derives 
from this insecurity. We also believe that the insecurity is transferred to the salesforce by arbitrary 
internal promotion such as: “Proactivity makes work much more fun!” (Teaching material 2013, 
Blutex). Promoting words are chosen because they are positively loaded rather than strategically 
aligned; entrepreneurial spirit sounds better than bureaucracy, proactivity sounds better than 
reactivity, participation and dialogue sounds better than authoritarian leadership and so on and so 
forth. We have seen how the top management’s equivocal reasoning whether Blutex is, or even 
should be proactive leads to equivocality. The equivocality expresses itself quite clearly during our 
interviews when the interviewees gave sense of the promoted strategy: 
 
“My view is that [organizational changes] have come through customers; ‘Could you 
please help us with this?’ and then those good customer relations you have, well... 
Then you do that change and like... now we do this change because the market is 
changing. 
Q: Would you describe this change as reactive then? 
“No.” 
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Q: But, more as proactive? 
“Yes.” 
Q: In what way? 
“Ehm... *silence*... No, but that was interesting... Why do I say that...?” 
Q: Well, you did say it was because the market is changing. 
“Which means it is... Then it is reactive. *Laugh* But that is not... It is because... 
now we will sell communication solutions which encapsulate a lot and many new 
services and... *laugh* new values for customers, while earlier it has been more 
product oriented.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
This type of sensegiving might lead to Larson and Tompkins’ (2005) conclusion that employees 
quickly become skeptical to the change when they notice the ambiguity among the top 
management. Furthermore, we believe that middle managers as a group are faced with a different 
pressure to make sense than salespeople. Middle managers are not only expected to deliver a 
satisfactory result, but also to implement the new working methods within their divisions. The 
responsibility for how to reach ‘Vision 2020’ in practice is transmitted to the middle managers, 
thus putting extra pressure in making sense of the change process ‘correctly’. We see this pressure 
as highly influential in the middle managers’ sensemaking process: 
 
“There are different interpretations of what ‘Vision 2020’ means, and I’m not sure 
that I’ve interpreted it correctly, I have interpreted it in my way. (...) But it is a bit... 
kind of empty, nothing is really clear. And in order to proceed [the organization] 
tries to fill it locally.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
Furthermore we would argue the dignity, purpose and concept of ‘Solution Selling’ is 
communicated ambiguously by the middle managers. To change the salesforce’s behavior 
according to ‘Solution Selling’, is promoted as crucial for the company’s survival by the top 
management and as an essential step towards reaching ‘Vision 2020’. According to our findings 
however, there is a common understanding within the salesforce that a satisfactory result is more 
important than selling accordingly to the concept of ‘Solution Selling’: 
 
“Let me tell you what - as long as they [the sales people] deliver, *laugh* they can do 
whatever the hell they want “ 
Middle manager, Blutex 
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This attitude is a great example of an equivocal cue given by the middle managers. On the one 
hand, the new common working methods to which its survival is depending on, are promoted 
strongly and in a grandiose manner. On the other hand, middle managers do not really care 
whether the salesperson changes his/her behavior or not, as long as the salesperson deliver a 
satisfactory result. Thus, the new method is promoted internally as crucial, but is managed only as 
something preferable in the daily work.  
 
Nevertheless, we believe that most salespeople at Blutex are ‘open for change’ – as long as the 
change is clearly connected to the sales results. Several of our interviewees state that by the end of 
the day, their only task is so sell solutions according to (and preferably more than) the budget. 
When a cultural change is communicated to them, they will listen and interpret the cues, but as 
long as the change is not directly concerning how to enhance their selling method, they have no 
reason to change simply because the salespeople perceive their current behavior as profit-
maximizing and thus ‘correct’. Once again, people see what they want to see in order for the cue 
to fit in with their identity needs (Coopey et al., 1997).  
 
To sum up, the top management’s sensegiving has in the first implementation phase focused on 
‘Vision 2020’ and the cultural changes but not on the actual concept of ‘Solution Selling’. As a 
result, salespeople and middle managers have been given both vague and equivocal cues, resulting 
in a fragmented understanding of the purpose and concept of ‘Solution Selling’ as well as other 
strategic core values. The low level of transparency combined with ambiguous formulations, are 
important aspects of the top management’s sensegiving process. In the next section, we will 
discuss the consequences of Blutex’s organizational sensemaking, where a collective frame for 
‘Solution Selling’ was lacking.  
 
5.2.2. No Collective Frame 
As previously stated, individual frames are created through lived experiences. This is also the case 
in organizational sensemaking. Organizational sensemaking therefore demands a collective frame, 
which is based on previous collective experiences. As stated in our theoretical framework, 
individuals are forced to use their own ways of making sense when organizational routines and 
scripts (i.e. collective frames) are unavailable. As we have seen in the case of Blutex, there were no 
obvious collective frames for ‘Solution Selling’. Instead, people tended to connect the cues to 
frames that made most sense on an individual level, both cognitively (what rationally seems right) 
and affectively (what emotionally feels right). 
 
The creation of collective frames is therefore something that is inevitable within a change process 
like this. The collective experiences will create new, or develop old organizational routines and 
scripts regardless of the change process’ content and outcome, thus creating a new collective 
frame. This insight brings us back to the question whether sensemaking is manageable. We have 
concluded that the creation of a collective frame is inevitable and that the individual sensemaking 
process “cannot be deliberately controlled” according to Weick’s (1995) fifth property. However, 
the possibility to influence the sensemaking process lies within the given cues. The person or 
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persons giving sense have a large influence over the cues’ level of clarity which in turn has a large 
influence on the prerequisites of the sensemaking process. Generally within an organization, the 
members’ many different individual frames create a large amount of lived experiences and thus 
many different frames. The common frame of reference is lost when organizational members 
interpret common events differently which according to Barr and Huff (1997) undermines the 
coordinated activity. Seen from the top management’s point of view, the risk of diverse 
interpretations is obviously bigger in cases where collective frames do not exist due to the large 
variety of frames which thus “cannot be deliberately controlled”.  However, this is only ‘true’ if 
one view a diversity of interpretation as unwanted. As previously stated the purpose of being 
strategically ambiguous is to encourage diverse interpretations and by doing so also encourage 
flexibility and creativity.  
 
We have seen how a diversity of interpretations was created at Blutex but at the same time, we are 
confident in saying that the creation of a collective frame will be made during the continued 
implementation of ‘Solution Selling’. What most likely will happen is that the diverse 
interpretations will be problematized, discussed and thereafter united into one common 
understanding. This is how a collective frame is created - through the bumpy road of making 
sense collectively. The collective sensemaking process thus aims to create Barr and Huff’s (1997) 
‘common frame of reference’ but it also undermines the purpose of strategic ambiguity; “to retain 
[people’s] differences of opinions under the guise of consensus” (Weick and Browning, 
1986:254). 
 
Let us now move on to analyzing the given cues rather than the lack of collective frame. In the 
next section, we will discuss why the given cues contributed to the described diversity of 
interpretations from a more holistic level perspective. We will in other words analyze why the 
organizational members interpreted the concept of ‘Solution Selling’ with such diversity by 
looking at the internal communication climate at Blutex and how communication is viewed. 
 
5.2.3. Top-Down Communication Climate 
 
“Sometimes I feel that; we are a communication company and we work with 
communication but we are so damn bad at communicating internally.” 
Sales person, Blutex 
 
There is internal communication within Blutex and a lot of it. The only problematic aspect of it is 
that it is often used as a ‘vehicle for information’ starting at the top and is then pushed down 
through the organization, either through the intranet or through middle managers. In other words, 
the internal communication is not viewed as a socially constructed process, as; “the very process 
by which the notion of organizing comes to acquire consensual meaning” (Mumby, 1988:15). The 
only case we have found, where communication is used as a process for constructing social reality 
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was the manner in which the middle managers were introduced to ‘Solution Selling’ in 
comparison to the salespeople.  
 
The way the top management gave sense to the middle managers in our case study is similar to 
the events of the case study done by Alvesson (2002) where the structures of a similar information 
meeting are analyzed. As in the case of Blutex, middle managers in Alvesson’s study were also 
informed prior to the other employees (represented by salespeople in the case of Blutex), where 
the procedure and management style was similar to a military discourse. Alvesson argues that this 
procedure could be viewed as a symbolic reward; to strengthen the managers’ sense of 
responsibility and to reinforce their position as ‘chosen’. The content of the communicated 
message is the same for the middle managers and the employees. However, it is the manner in 
which the employees receive the message in a much larger group that creates a feeling of 
importance among the middle managers. In the case of Blutex, we see this as an important aspect 
of the middle managers’ compliance in the top-down organization of Blutex. Whether these 
different views on communication are intentional or not is difficult to tell from our empirical 
material, and will thus remain unanswered. 
 
Another influential aspect of Blutex’s communication climate is the lack of transparency between 
the different hierarchical levels. According to our analysis, the lack of transparency perceived by 
the salesforce has had a large influence over the diverse interpretations, in particular the 
program’s upcoming training sessions. The salespeople or middle managers seemed to have little 
or no knowledge of the next implementation phases, which complicated the sensemaking of the 
change program’s context. As we have seen in the empirical material, the first training session did 
focus on the cultural changes instead of the actual instructional parts. Because of this, ‘Solution 
Selling’ has not been interpreted as an educational program. This in turn contributed to that the 
salespeople concluded that they do not need to change their behavior. The result from a holistic 
point of view is that ‘Solution Selling’ often is perceived by the organizational members as a 
mysterious journey which they cannot influence nor overlook. 
 
Furthermore, we have seen in our empirical material how communicative disagreements with top 
managers are perceived as problematic and difficult for several salespeople. Johansson and Heide 
(2008b) state this as another reason for why the internal communication seldom works bottom-up. 
In order to get influence in an organization, employees with lower status must to a great extent 
agree with those with a higher status. According to our analysis, this leads to two important 
implications. First of all, managers risk making decisions on insufficient basis of information due 
to the distorted overly positive feedback. Second of all, employees that do not criticize are 
perceived as compliant and positive employee who is ‘open for change’ and gain therefore 
influence and credibility, as opposed to those who propose critical feedback: 
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“I believe that you [as a Blutex salesperson] should be forward and open for new 
suggestions (...) and not stare yourself blind on how it used to be back in the days, 
but to adapt to a new working method and (...) to actually see the positive side of it 
and so on. That, I believe is an extremely important qualification. Everyone doesn’t 
have it, which you have to deal with. Some question it a bit more like; ‘Is this a good 
working method?’ and then you have to motivate these people.” 
Middle manager, Blutex 
 
We would argue that the sensemaking process generally is facilitated by an open communication 
climate. This is also a precondition for a healthy centralized decision-making since an open 
communication climate provides the decision-makers with sufficient basis of information.  
 
An important part of the communication climate is how organizational members give sense. As 
we have seen, most salespeople and middle managers did not give sense simply because they 
chose to interpret ‘Solution Selling’ through an already existing frame; ‘business as usual’, 
‘relationship management’, or ‘CRM’. From a holistic perspective, we would argue that lack of 
sensegiving is also a result of the dominating rationalistic view on communication as a ‘vehicle for 
information’ within Blutex as it does not encourage sensegiving. To push down information top-
down and then ask the organizational members; ‘have everyone understood?’ creates consensus 
and reinforces the diversity of interpretations. Affirmative answers may be honest, but we believe 
that the organizational members’ perceptions are built upon an insufficient sensemaking process. 
Hence, it is the lack of sensemaking that facilitates the purpose of being strategically ambiguous; to 
create consensus and reinforce the diversity of interpretations. 
 
We believe that this serves as a complementary explanation to Beer’s et al. (1990) conclusions on 
why top-down change processes led by corporate groups such as human resources is “too risky as 
a deliberate strategy” (1990:159). As mentioned in our theoretical background, the most 
successful top managers from the study done by Beer et al. (1990) were those who limited their 
own power and created a climate for change, rather than insisting on specific solutions, and thus 
creating a trade-off between allowing uncertainty and creating resistance. We would also argue that 
this is aligned with the statement of Balogun and Johnson (2005). The authors state that managers 
should encourage employees to make and give sense in their presence, and thereby control the 
contexts of sensemaking rather than trying to control the sensemaking process itself. 
 
5.3. Summary 
Due to the top management’s ambiguity and the view on communication as a ‘vehicle for 
information’, the cues regarding ‘Solution Selling’ have been interpreted differently by many 
inside the organization. All interviewees were positive to the change program and we argue that 
the reason why no one has opposed the ‘Solution Selling’ program perceptively is because there 
has been no collective frame. When there is no collective frame and the cues are ambiguous the 
 
56 
 
individuals are forced to make sense from their own set of frames whereby they make their own 
separate interpretations. These interpretations are based on several individual factors such as 
identity, expectations, emotions and pressure (Mailloux, 1990). And as seen in this chapter, the 
result of this is that people see what they want to see and interpret the program as something they 
know how to relate to by connecting the new vague cues to pre-existing frames.  
 
Salespeople interpret ‘Solution Selling’ as something they already do, whereby no one takes the 
view that they personally need to change any particular actions and thus behavior. The middle 
managers however are in another situation and cannot simply come to the conclusion that “this is 
something we already do”. They are under pressure to make sense of this change process 
‘correctly’ as the top management expects them to help drive the change as change agents. The 
middle managers must be able to mediate the change process to their subordinates and do this by 
concretizing what the change entails for the salespeople. This suggests that it is important for the 
middle managers to find a way of describing the practical changes for their subordinates and to be 
able to answer questions. We further highlight that middle managers would want to implement 
change in a way so that the results are visible for top management and in the best case even 
measurable. 
 
This is striking for Blutex, as the focus on measurable results and that the evaluation of every 
thing’s importance and relevance is done from the perspective of ‘how does this benefit to the 
revenue of Blutex’. The revenue issue is highly influential in Blutex as it (a) filters what feedback 
is brought to the attention of the top management, thereby undermining the internal 
communication, and (b) counteracts the change process as there are no incentives to change when 
the salespeople ‘can do whatever they want as long as they deliver’. We argue that this is another 
consequence of the top management’s strategic ambiguity. However in our analysis we have 
noticed that Blutex was being strategically ambiguous in order to reach consensus within the top 
management and not to preserve individuals’ different social realities, which raises the question 
whether it has been chosen as a strategy or not. If it has not been chosen actively it is fair to 
question whether the ambiguity really is ‘strategic’. In the next chapter, we will discuss our findings 
presented in this chapter and come to conclusions by analyzing our findings from a more holistic 
perspective in order to answer our initial research questions. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we will view our theoretical framework and analysis from a holistic perspective in 
order to increase the understanding how the organizational members’ sensemaking affects 
Blutex’s change process. We will first discuss the top management’s problematization, the causes 
and consequences of our results, and thereafter present our conclusions by answering our initial 
research questions. The chapter is summed up with an academic reflection where we provide new 
reference points of the thesis’ conclusions. 
 
6.1. Discussion 
We would like to start this concluding discussion by reflecting upon the top management’s 
problematization. As stated in section 4.1.3. the top management perceived resistance in terms of  
salespeople not changing their behavior according to the concept of ‘Solution Selling’. We have in 
our analysis seen how the process of making sense of ‘Solution Selling’ among the salesforce has 
affected their unchanged behavior. Salespeople simply interpreted ‘Solution Selling’ as a selling 
method which they already had adopted and been working according to for several years. 
Needless to say, when every salesperson believed that they, as individuals did not need to change, 
little or no change of behavior occurred, despite the positive consensus regarding the concept of 
‘Solution Selling’. This in turn created a mutual skepticism between the hierarchical levels, where 
the top management on the one hand perceived resistance to change, whereas the salespeople on 
the other hand perceived a lack of participation, transparency and internal communication. We 
believe that this skepticism derives from the top management’s ambiguous communication.  
 
According to our analysis, Blutex often viewed communication only as a ‘vehicle for information’ 
rather than a socially constructed process. We see the ambiguous communication as a method of 
creating consensus among the organizational members, what we refer to as ‘strategic ambiguity’. 
However, we became confused once we distinguished the strategic ambiguity, due to Blutex’s 
conflicting purpose of being strategically ambiguous.  
 
As stated in section 5.1.4. the conventional purpose of being strategically ambiguous is, according 
to Eisenberg (1984) to allow flexibility and creativity on an individual level within a common 
organizational change process and at the same time to create consensus. Focus is to “guard against 
the acceptance of one standard way of viewing organizational reality” (1984:236). Blutex for 
instance created a positive consensus towards ‘Solution Selling’ and at the same time diverse 
interpretations of the concept. However, top managers seemed frustrated over, what they 
perceived as ‘misinterpretations’ of ‘Solution Selling’ and the lack of changed behavior among the 
salesforce. This, together with other similar empirical findings, such as the rationalistic view on 
communication, and a low level of transparency and influence, indicate a rather low tolerance 
among managers towards allowing and encouraging creativity, flexibility and different social 
realities. So why would top managers be strategically ambiguous at Blutex if a diversity of 
interpretations is unwanted?   
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We concluded in our analysis that top managers seem to fall back on traditional cultural values 
when the benefits of the new organizational culture and identity cannot be articulated. During our 
interviews and the time spent at Blutex, we have noticed insecurity among top managers over what 
to keep in the ‘old’ culture and identity, and what to change for the future. This insecurity 
manifested itself through communicating equivocal and contradictory messages and by doing so 
also transferring the responsibility to middle managers of how to give sense to the vague vision 
and translate it into practice. From this perspective, the top management’s reasons for being 
ambiguous is similar to how Weick and Browning (1986) view vagueness within strategic 
ambiguity: 
 
“Vagueness is a source of power, a form of slack, and a means of building 
consensus” 
Weick and Browning, 1986:254 
 
However, whether the transfer of responsibility actually was an intentional strategy in order to 
maintain the centralized power or an unintentional effect of the insecurity is difficult to tell from 
our empirical material, and will thus remain unanswered.  
 
We believe that another important reason for why top managers are insecure of what should be 
changed is that none of our interviewees felt that the change was initiated voluntarily by Blutex. 
Rather, the organizational members’ perception is that Blutex was forced to change due to 
changes in the market. If the change would have come from inside Blutex in a proactive rather 
than a reactive manner, we believe that it would have been easier to be more self-critical towards 
the culture and identity, and thus easier to decide what to change and what to keep.  
 
In order to sum up this discussion, we would like to connect this discussion to the trade-off 
mentioned in chapter 5. As we have seen, a consequence of being strategically ambiguous is the 
creation of diverse interpretations, which in the case of Blutex was viewed as ‘misinterpretations’. 
The creations of these ‘misinterpretations’ becomes in this sense an unwanted effect of being 
vague which takes us back to the trade-off between allowing uncertainty (thus allowing diversity of 
interpretations) and creating resistance (thus counteracting consensus). Our conclusion is that 
Blutex have been strategically ambiguous in order to reach consensus among the organizational 
members, but have not found a way of managing the diversity of interpretations. As stated in our 
theoretical framework, Beer et al. (1990) concluded that senior managers often understand the 
necessity for change, but “misunderstand what it takes to bring it about” (1990:158). 
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6.2. Conclusions 
We will now return to our initial research questions to see how these have been answered in the 
thesis. 
 
“1. What does the sensemaking process look like on an individual level from the 
perspective of cues and frames and how does it explain organizational members’ 
perceptions and behavior in a change process?” 
 
In chapter 3 we presented a visualization of how we see the sensemaking process on a detailed 
level in the terms of cues and frames. This framework was used in chapter 5 where we used our 
framework to get an understanding of what the sensemaking has looked like in the change process 
of Blutex. According to our analysis the individual’s sensemaking process is highly influential in 
change processes because when collective frames are missing the individual is left to make sense 
of what is going on based on his/her pre-existing individual frames (i.e. previous experiences). 
This may result in a wide variety of interpretations of the same organizational event, which in turn 
leads to diverse behavior from the employees. To sum up, we have seen how the concept of cues 
and frames is undertheorized in sensemaking but have the potential to further increase the 
understanding of change processes. For instance, we showed in our case study how organizational 
members actively avoided making sense by avoiding giving sense and perhaps even disregarding 
cues that did not fit with the pre-existing frames; this in order to preserve their social reality.  
 
“2. How is it that organizational members can have diverse interpretations of a 
change process and at the same time (a) have consensus of the change as being 
something positive and (b) be sure that their individual interpretation of the change is 
‘correct’?” 
 
Having different perceptions of something but still agreeing on it would seem to be a paradox. 
This is however possible if what the parties agree on is so loosely defined that it fits all parites’ 
perceptions. In turn, they are able to preserve their different social realities and all feel that their 
specific reality is ‘true’. This is the idea of ‘strategic ambiguity’. In Blutex the top management was 
strategically ambiguous in order to create consensus in the initiated change process. However, we 
identified that this was perhaps not an active choice from the top managers, but instead a way to 
manage the insecurity within the top management group concerning the new organizational 
culture and identity that external changes in the market has imposed on the company.  
 
Blutex is a hierarchical top-down organization where communication has traditionally been 
viewed as a ‘vehicle for information’ and changes have been implemented top-down in a fairly 
enclosed communication climate. Top managers have stated that there is a strong need for 
consensus within the top management group before making any decisions. Once the decision has 
been made, the change is communicated under a guise of consensus through vague formulations 
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which in the case of ‘Solution Selling’ has resulted in a low level of resistance towards the message 
itself, but a diversity of interpretations of what the message is all about.  
 
What has been ignored (and unaddressed) in the top management is that the conventional 
purpose of strategic ambiguity is not only to create consensus but to also avoid for organizational 
members to create one common organizational reality. This creates a clash with Blutex’s purpose 
as the ideal for its management style would be that everyone had the same organizational reality. 
Now, organizational members have created their own interpretations (in line with the 
‘conventional’ purpose of strategic ambiguity) which in this sense is viewed as an unwanted 
consequence by the top management. Top managers do not want to surrender the power to make 
strategic judgments to subordinates. However, they have transferred the responsibility to turn the 
vision into practice to middle managers - a vision which the middle managers have not 
participated in formulating. 
 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
In the next three sections, we will reflect upon our thesis in general and our conclusions in 
particular, from an academic perspective. The purpose of academic reflexivity is according to 
Alvesson et al. (2008:497); “to encourage insights about the nature of social science” by providing 
new reference points of the thesis’ conclusions and contributions to academia. As a continuation 
to this, we will also suggest how our thesis might underpin future research within the field of 
organizational sensemaking. 
 
6.3.1. Academic Reflexivity 
We have in our analysis, according to the reflexivity framework conducted by Alvesson et al. 
(2008) tried to both deconstruct and reconstruct our findings in order to “question the chosen 
elements of the logic of the research project and its outcomes” (2008:494) and to “open up new 
avenues, paths, and lines of interpretation to produce ‘better’ research ethically, politically, 
empirically, and theoretically” (2008:495). In other words, we have questioned our orthodox 
understandings and assumptions through deconstruction, and at the same time tried to create and 
introduce new assumptions through reconstruction. Our purpose of this thesis has been to 
provide new understandings of socially constructed realities through a philosophical sophistication 
of our empirical material and analysis. In this sense, we share Alvesson and Sköldberg’s (2007) 
view on philosophical sophistication as not being the principal task of social research, yet essential 
in order to ensure the quality of the actual research. We also share Alvesson’s (2002) standpoint 
that social researchers can, and should contribute to people’s liberation from unnecessarily 
restrictive traditions, assumptions and power relations. 
 
Our conclusions are therefore a result of creative analysis of our empirical findings and 
philosophical reflexivity. In other words, we have questioned both established ‘truths’ at Blutex 
and existing theory within social research. In the case of Blutex, we have critically analyzed the 
mutual skepticism and the sensemaking process between the hierarchical levels. As for the 
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existing theory, we have developed an initial framework for what we see as the core of 
sensemaking; how cues and frames are connected. However, we do realize that our main purpose 
of the explanatory model in chapter 3 is not to contribute to the theory of sensemaking, but to 
simply give sense to the way we have analyzed the empirical material. In this sense, the model 
serves as more persuasive than academically guiding. Our hope is nevertheless that our 
framework will underpin future research by enhancing Weick’s sensemaking theory.  
 
Before moving on to the next section, we would like to reflect upon our method. In our inductive 
approach, we gathered a wide variety of empirical material with many different interesting angles, 
which turned out to be quite demanding creatively and analytically. However, the most difficult 
problem to handle for us, was David Hume’s famous philosophical problem of induction; that the 
search for other disparate examples could go on forever, as the next finding may shed new light 
on the research. We have chosen to deal with this problem according to Sjöberg and Västerfors' 
(2008) recommendations, namely to be humble to our interpretations of the limited empirical 
data, and by encouraging the continuation and improvement of our interpretations as well as our 
theoretical framework. In the next section, we will provide our thoughts on possible continuations 
and improvements for future research. 
 
6.3.2. Contributions to Academia and Future Research  
In this thesis, we have explored cues, frames, and the mutual relation between them by using 
sensemaking as the primary body of theory for analysis. We have tried to enhance the 
sensemaking theory, which according to Helms Mills et al. (2010) is not yet widely recognized as a 
method of analysis. We developed a framework in order to illustrate how we see the sensemaking 
process from this perspective, and by doing so also provide empirical material and analysis to an 
undertheorized gap in the organizational sensemaking literature. Interestingly enough, we found 
new undertheorized gaps within this perspective, for instance the phenomenon which we refer to 
as ‘cementing’. We believe that the process of cementing a connection is essential when 
interpreting the perspective of cues and frames. More empirical research is needed in how social 
aspects as ‘prestige’ and ‘pride’ affect the willingness and capability to break an existing connection 
and instead make a new one, thus reinterpreting one’s social reality. For instance, what affects the 
judgment of disregarding relevant cues due to already cemented connections? We have not been 
able to find any literature or research within organizational sensemaking regarding this matter and 
we encourage more research within this field of sensemaking.  
 
Furthermore, we have provided additional empirical material regarding how strategic ambiguity 
affects a top-down change process. We have for instance showed how the perspective of cues and 
frames can increase the understanding of why organizational members are reluctant to reinterpret 
their social realities. Our hope is also that the thesis has sophisticated the aspects of being 
strategically ambiguous through our empirical material and analysis, and by doing so increase the 
understanding of organizational change processes from another angle. 
 
 
62 
 
To sum up, we would like to reflect upon our empirical findings regarding strategic ambiguity. In 
2006, Eisenberg reflected upon his work from 1984 by writing; “I paid little attention to other 
dynamics, such as how ambiguity can mask and sustain abuses of power. Looking back, I am also 
unsure about my relational definition of strategic ambiguity; it seemed to make sense at the time, 
but has proven difficult to study” (2006:3). We would argue that our analytical findings confirms 
Eisenberg’s theory of how ambiguity contributes to consensus and diverse social realities, but also 
reinforce Eisenberg’s problematization from 2006. As mentioned in our conclusions, we have not 
been able to conclude whether the purpose of Blutex’s strategic ambiguity was in order to 
maintain the centralized power or not. In this sense, we share Eisenberg’s conclusion that it is 
difficult to study strategic ambiguity when it come to these kinds of underlying motives. However, 
we encourage social researchers to continue to investigate this mystery as it is a complex 
phenomenon which if solved would contribute to the understanding of organizational change 
processes. 
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